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Introduction
Economists, policymakers and the public have long debated the usefulness of aggregate financial
variables as instruments and indicators ofFederal Reserve monetary policy. For more than twenty-five
years the Federal Reserve Bank ofSt. Louis’ adjusted monetary base has been one ofthese indicators. In
this paper, weexplorehow changes in the U.S. banking industry and financial markets since the
implementation of the Monetary Control Actin 1980 have affected the definition, construction and
interpretation of the adjusted monetary base,’ We proposean expanded measure of the monetary source
base and anew adjustment forthe effects ofchanges in reserve requirements.
Central banks worldwide characterize the stance of their monetary policy in terms of atarget
level forashort-term market interest rate. In the intermediateto longer-run, however, the policy goalof
price stability leads to evaluationof policy in terms ofthe growth of quantitativevariables such as bank
reserves, the monetary base or monetary aggregates.2 History suggests that sustained inflation cannot
occur without expansion in such financial variables. In his survey of targets and instruments of monetary
policy, Friedman (1990) notes the complementary roles of interest rates and monetary aggregates,
including measures ofthe monetary base and total reserves (adjusted forchanges in reserve
requirements): “Whether to keyopen market operations toa quantity or aprice is an issue of first-order
importance in normative monetary economics, and has been so fora long time.”3 Further, Friedman
* Revised version of manuscript prepared for the symposium “The Revised St. Louis Adjusted Monetary Base: New
Measures in Old Theories”, FederalReserve Bank ofSt. Louis, March 29, 1996. We thank Daniel Steiner and
Cindy Gleit for research assistance, and the staffofthe Division of Monetary Affairs at the Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System for providing the panel dataset used in this article
‘The period before 1980 is discussed by Tatom (1980),
2 See for example the papers in Wijnholds et. al. (1993).
Friedman (1990), p. 1 189~AndersonandRasche, “Defining theAdjusted Monetary Base...” WorkingPaper 96-014 2
emphasizes that Poole’s basic insight -- that the central bank’s optimal policy rule involvesboth an
interestrate and aquantity vairable -- carriesover into models with more complex aggregate demand-
aggregate supply behavior thanthose examined by Poole.
The first section of the paper briefly addresses the role of the monetary base, adjusted for
changes in reserve requirements, as amonetary policy indicator in dynamic stochastic models. In the
context ofa monetary authority that targets a short-term interest rate according to Taylor’s Rule, the
adjusted monetary base may furnish additional, marginal information about the stance of monetary policy
whenthe model economy is subject to unobserved shocks. The second section ofthe paper argues that
current measuresof the monetary base should be broadened to include all the Federal Reserve deposits
held by depository institutions. Current measures exclude the amount ofFederal Reserve deposits held
to satisfy required clearing balance contracts, thereby implicitly imposing an indefensible separation
between Federal Reserve deposits used to settle interbank payments andthose used to satisfy statutory
reserve requirements. The third section examines the demandfor the monetary base in amoney supply
model. The model differs from earlier analyses by explicitly separating the roles ofdepository
institutions whose portfolio decisions are affected by statutory reserve requirements from those whose
actions are not. The fourth section assesses the importance of separating thesedisparate groupsof
institutions by analyzingalarge longitudinal database.
1. When MighttheAdjustedMonetary Base Furnish an IndicatorofMonetary Policy?
The shift toward policy activism during the 1960s stimulated research on indicators ofthe stance
ofeconomic policy. Regarding the indicator problemforfiscal policy, Blinder and Solow (1974) wrote:
“Since Keynes, acommon ... presumption in the economics profession has heldthat the
government budget can influence the aggregate level of income andemployment. Ifthis is
correct, an attempt to quantify the impact seemsa natural nextstep; that is, after classifying
policy A as “expansive”and policy B as “contractionary,” economists would like to be able to
say that policy C is “more expansive”than policy A andto give somequantitative meaningto
such astatement.AndersonandRasehe, “Definingthe AdjustedMonetary Base. WorkingPaper96-014 3
“Noneofthis necessarily argues fora single numberto be used as ‘the’ measureoffiscal
influence. Wheneveroneattempts to reduce amultidimensional concept -- like the influenceof
the government on aggregate economic activity -- to asingle dimension, index number problems
inevitably arise.
“However, the political realities ofthe day seem to dictate settling on asingle index to measure
the overall expansionaryor contractionaryeffect ofany proposed tax and expenditure program.
If economists do not come up with one, the public or the Congress will probably invent its own,
andthe choice is unlikely to be the best. Instead, then, of trying to talk the layman out ofseeking
such a number, economists might do better to lead him to a “sensible” concept.”
Blinderand Solow (1974), pp. 11-12
andthe indicator problemformonetary policy was summarized by Brunner and Meltzer(1969):
“Theindicator problem of monetary policy is the problem of constructingascalethat is invariant
up toamonotone transformation and that provides alogicalfoundation forstatements comparing
the thrust of policy. (italics in original)
“Theindicator of monetary policy provides ascale(or ordering of policy actions)that permits
policy makers, economists, and others to compare the thrust ofmonetary policy on economic
activity, that is, to characterize onepolicy as more expansivethananotheror to characterize
policies as more (or less) expansivethan before. Statements comparing current policies to other
policies that might have been chosen or to policies chosen at other times requires such ascale.”
Brunner andMeltzer (1969), p. 2.
Many economists have suggested that short-term market interest rates are adequate indicators of the
stance ofpolicy when the monetary authority also is concerned about the path ofthe economy’s price
level,4 In these models, the pricelevel is both influenced by monetary policy andprovides important
feedback regarding how the private sector interprets the current stance ofpolicy relativefuture inflation.
Yet, except for very shortperiods, central bank actions are but one of many factors that influence market
rates.5 Acentral bank that attempts to maintain for more thana briefperiod ashort-term interest rate
target below the level consistent with the equilibrium real interest rate and current inflation expectations
will find itselfcontributing to an acceleration of inflation by injecting largeamounts of high-powered
~It is well-known that the price level is indeterminate in pure interestrate targeting models. This indeterminacy is
usually removed ifcentral bank’s feedback rules include some weight on the price level, GDP, or another nominal
variable.
~Numerous authors have emphasized thatendogenous variables may be misleading policy indicators. The issue is
not the endogeneity of the indicator variable but rather the size ofthe relative error that results from using one
variable versus another; see for example Brunner and Meltzer (1969) and Dewald (1969).Anderson andRasche, “Defining the AdjustedMonetary Base...” Working Paper 96-014 4
money via purchases of securities. Similarly, an interest rate target set above that which is consistent
with the equilibrium real rate and current inflation expectations will force the central bank to withdraw
high-powered money from the economy at an accelerating rate, slowing atleast near-term growth and
perhaps leadingto deflation. We accept as axiomatic that, over the long run, the behaviorofthe price
level in modern monetary economies is largely determined by the size of the balance sheet of the central
bank.
The concept of the monetary base has been used by many analysts under different names.
Burgess (1936, p. 274) discussed the sum of the monetary gold stock and FederalReserve credit as a
foundation forthe money stock. Gurley and Shaw (1960) used the concept of“outside money”. Tobin
(1961) refers to “noninterest bearinggovernment debt”, Friedman and Schwartz (1963) utilize “high
powered money”and Brunner(1961) discusses the “monetary base”. Each ofthese concepts combines
in asingle index the effects of threeFederalReserve monetary policy actions on the supply of high
powered money -- open market operations, discount window lending andunsterilized foreign exchange
market intervention. Although most ofthese analysts also recognizedchanges in reserve requirements as
an instrument ofFederalReserve monetary policy, they did not integrate this into their monetary policy
indicator.
Brunner (1961) definedthe monetary base as the sum of currency in circulation outside Federal
Reserve Banks and the US Treasury, plus thedeposits of membercommercialbanks at Federal Reserve
Banks. At the time, these itemswere most ofthe non-interest bearingmonetary liabilities of the Federal
Reserve and the Treasury to the private sector ofthe economy.6 Brunner alsodefinedthe concept of the
extended monetary base which added to the monetary base ameasure of “liberated” reserves, defined as
~Brunner’s measure ofthe monetary base excludes Federal Reserve deposits held by nonmember banks and by Edge
Act corporations(the latterhaving begun in 1959), The measures ofthe monetary base constructed by Friedman and
Schwartz(1963. appendix A) and Cagan (1965) include (estimates of) these deposits.AndersonandRasche, “DefiningtheAdjusted Monetary Base...” Working Paper96-014 5
the amount of reserves absorbed or liberatedby changes in legal reserve requirement ratios.7 So far as
wecan determine, Brunner (1961) was the first published article to proposeanalytically combining
changes in the monetary base with changes in reserve requirements so as to form an index of quantitative
monetary policy actions.8 In the remainder of thispaper, weadopt more current usage andrefer to the
extended monetary base as the adjusted monetary base.9
The concept of the adjusted monetary base is important becausethe monetary base, not adjusted
forchanges in reserve requirement ratios, is defective as ameasure of monetary policy: it omits the
iteraction between current changes in reserve requirement ratios andfuture changes in the level of
reservable deposits. The correspondingproblem in measuring fiscal policy is well-known. In their
classic discussion, Blinderand Solow (1974) show thatasimple unweighted linear combination of
differentfiscal policy instruments, such as the full employment surplus, is inadequate as afiscalpolicy
indicator variable because it does not appropriatelycapture the interaction between current changes in
tax rates andfuture changes in the level ofincome. As an alternative to the full employment surplus,
Blinder and Solow proposean indicatorconstructed as a weighted average of various fiscal policy
instruments, the weights proportional to the reduced form multipliers from the assumed model ofthe
macroeconomy.
Blinder and Solow’s fiscal policy indicator provides ascale, unique up to amonotone
transformation, fordiscussingchanges in the stance of fiscal policy. It is straightforward to show, within
the context of a very general model, that the adjusted monetary base providesamonetary policy indicator
‘~The terminology of absorbtion and liberation ofreserves through changes in legal reserve ratios can be found in
official Federal Reserve publicationsat leastas early as 1954. See Board of Governors ofthe Federal Reserve
System (1954), p. 51.
~Theprecise intellectual heritage ofthe extended monetary base is clouded. Many researchers before Brunner
(1961) had examined models of thesupply of money based on a money multiplier/monetary base decomposition, and
some of them had exploredthe effects ofchanges in reserve requirement ratios on the money multiplier. See for
exampleTolley (1957), Meigs (1962), Dewald (1963a, b), Teigen (1964) and Benston (1969). Yet, to the bestof
our knowledge, none ofthem proposed measuring monetary policy by combining changes in the monetary source
base with the effects of changes in statutory reserve requirements on demand for the base.Andersonand Rasehe, ~‘Defining the AdjustedMonetary Base. WorkingPaper 96-014 6
analogous to Blinderand Solow’s fiscal policy measure. Interpreted as apolicy indicator, the
construction ofthe adjusted monetary base proceeds exactly as Blinder and Solow (1974) construct their
fiscal policy indicator.
Consider the most commonly-used class ofmacroeconomic models, those in which the Federal
Reserve’s policy actions are transmitted to the economy through changes in the money stock, M. All
macroeconomic models that include checkable deposits,currency and bank reserves contain such a
money supply function, explicitly or implicitly; see Anderson and Rasche (1982).b0 Assuming for
simplicity a single typeofcheckable deposit and letting M~ denote transaction money (currency plus
checkabledeposits), the money stock in such models may be written as M1
= xMB~, where MB~is
the adjusted monetary base, m, 1+ 1s is the monetary base multiplier for M, k~ is the ratio of
t + e~. +
currency to checkabledeposits, r~is the legal reserve requirement ratio and e1 is the “excess reserve”
ratio.” Assuming ageneral equilbrium model, allow the variables k~ and e1 to depend on all the other
economic variables ofthe system, including interest rates and income.’2 Suppressingtime subscripts,
totally differentiating the money supply function gives
dM—m dMB+MBdm
and omitting all terms except those in drwe have
‘~We caution the reader that Brunner used the term “adjusted monetary base” in some writings to referto the
nonborrowed extended monetary base, equal to theextended base minus borrowings offinancial institutions from the
Federal Reserve. Here, no such subtraction is made.
~ For arecent example, see Chari, Christiano andEichenbaum(1995).
~ For simplicity and without loss ofgenerality, assume that there have been no changes in reserve requirements and
that noneare anticipated such that the monetary base equals the adjusted monetary base. Excess reserves hereequal
all base money held by depository institutions minus their required reserves.
12 A liquidity effect arises in Chari, Christiano and Eichenbaum (1995), for example, because the public is unable to
rapidly adjust its holdings ofcurrency following a helicopter drop ofbase money. Banks find themselves with
substantial amounts ofexcess reserves, and initiallye increases. Subsequently, portfolio adjustments by banks and
households cause both eand k to decrease.Andersonand Rasche, “Definingthe Adjusted Monetary Base. WorkingPaper96-014 7
(m~
~~.r+e+k)
Substituting thisexpression into that for dM andutilizing the definitionofthe monetary base as
MB (r+e+k)D whereDi scheckabledeposits gives
dM =m[dMB—Ddr]+”.
The term [dMB — Ddr I is Brunner’s “extended monetary base” indicator variable, and —Ddr is the
amount ofreserves absorbed or liberated by changes in the legal reserverequirement ratio.
The extended monetary base is an indicator, or index, of the stance ofmonetary policy because it
providesascale that is invariant up toa monotone transformation, where m is the factor of
proportionality, fordiscussingchanges in the direction and thrust of monetary policy. Yet, the extended
monetary base does not necessarilyprovide acomplete indicator formonetary policy in all economic
models. In general, the extended monetary base will capture less than the full effect ofmonetary policy
when FederalReserve quantitativepolicy actions directly affect variables otherthanM. Such models
include, forexample, those with utility and production functions in which MB and renteras separate
arguments, rather than in the linear combination [dMB — Ddr]. One such class ofmodels are those that
include real private net wealth as an argument in the consumption function. Consider amodel in which
agents discount future tax liabilities to some extentso that interest bearinggovernment debtdoes not
enternet worth dollar-for-dollar, while non-interest bearingclaims on thecentral bank enterat face
value. In such amacroeconomy, open market operations that change the monetary base directly affect
the nominal net worth of the private sector in additionto their effect on the supply ofnominal money
balances. In contrast, changes in reserve requirements affect the supply of nominal money balances but
do not affect the nominal net worth ofthe private sector. As a second example, the adjusted monetary
base might also fail to indicate the complete impact ofmonetary policy in models that contain both
money and credit markets, and which assume that intermediated credit is not a perfect substitute for non-Anderson andRasche, “Defining the AdjustedMonetary Base.. .“ Working Paper96-014 8
intermediated credit. In such models, achange in reserve availability may affect bank lending without
necessarily causingaparallelchange in the money stock, M.
In models such as these where the extended monetary base is notacomplete policy indicator,
measuring the relativemagnitudes ofthe various monetary transmission channels requires estimates of
the structure ofadynamic, and perhaps stochastic, model, Because such estimates are difficult to obtain,
few (if any) exist. In the absence ofestimates to the contrary, it is ourjudgment that the extended
monetary base likely captures most ofthe longer-run impactof monetary policy on the price level.
Beyond its definition and measurement, afrequent objection to the use ofthe adjusted monetary
base as an indicatorof monetary policy is that central banks infact rarely use the base as amonetary
policy target.’3 In policy regimes wherethe central bank targets the level of ashort-term interest rate, the
adjusted monetary base is jointly endogenous with real output and the price level (orthe inflation rate).
The objection is faulty, atleast in part, because it fails to recognize the difference between the targetsof
monetary policy andindicators ofthe stance ofpolicy. The adjusted monetary base arises as an indicator
variable in modelsofsuch policy regimes becauseit maycontain marginal informationregarding the
path of theeconomy beyond the information contained in other contemporaneously-observable
endogenous variables.’4 Such value arises if, when monetary policy pegs a nominal interest rate in the
short-run and heavily smoothes fluctuations ofthe nominal rate in an intermediaterun, changes in the
growth rate of the adjusted monetary base provide information on unobserved movements in
contemporary or future real output and/or the pricelevel after the economy experiences nonmonetary
exogenous shocks. Absent a structural model, the way in which such information may arise can be
illustrated with the descriptive policy rule suggested by Taylor (1993) in which there is apegged short-
run nominal rate but the peg is adjusted overtime through a feedback rule to achieve a long-run inflation
~The arguments presented throughout this section also apply to the concept ofadjusted total reserves or adjusted
nonborrowed reserves.
~ Friedman (1990) labels such endogenous variables that are not policy targets as “information variables”. See also
Brunner and Meltzer(1964, 1969).Anderson and Rasche, “Defining theAdjusted Monetary Base WorkingPaper 96-014 9
target under an assumedequilibrium real interest rate. Below, weshow thatthe monetary base may be of
value in predicting movements in the pricelevel when such amodel is subject to unobserved shocks.
Consider ~y macroeconomy which is characterized by ademandfunction forreal balances:
L(i,Y,~,)
where ~, represents all disturbances to the demandforreal balances other than i and Y,and we have
suppressed time subscripts. Assume that shocksto the demandforreal balances are transitory, such
that E1 is stationary. Since in every time period the product of the adjusted monetary base, AMB, and its
associated multiplier, m, are identically equal to the money stock, M = m*AMB,this can be rewritten
as’5
AMB*m
Let the excess reserve ratio component, e, ofthe adjusted monetary base multiplier beafunctionof the
nominal interest rate and astationary disturbance term 2
e=e(i,e2)
and let the currency/deposit ratio, k, ofthe adjusted monetary base multiplier beafunction ofthe
nominal interest rate, real output and adisturbance term
k=k(i,Y,~3).
~ We have in mind here a narrow transaction monetary aggregate such as Ml or MzM (Ml + money market mutual
funds). For a suitably defined multiplier, a broader monetary aggregate also is acceptable.AndersonandRasche, “Defining the Adjusted MonetaryBase...” WorkingPaper 96-014 10
These general specifications of the adjusted monetary basemultiplier encompass abroad range ofmodels
ofthe financial sectorofthe macroeconomy.’6
The relationship between growth ofthe adjusted monetary base, the monetary base multiplier and
the price level is obtained by totally differentiating the above expression forthe AMB:
dAMB dm dp (PL.”~ . dY dE,
+——----=l —i- Idi+ (L,Y)—+—
AMB m p \~.M) Y E,
where s, is normalized so that aone percent shock corresponds to a onepercent change in the demand
for real balances, E (L, Y) = is the elasticity of the demandfor real balances with respect to real
aL(i, Y,ç,) aL(i, Y,e,)
output, L1
= , and L1, =
Given the specification of e( )and k( ),and letting E (x,y) continue to denote the elasticity of x
with respect to y, wealso have that
dm dYI k. e.l dE2 d 3
— =E (m,k)e(k,Y)—+I E(m,k)—1-+E(1n,k)--~ Idi-+- E (m,k)—+ E(m,e)—
m k ej
where ~2 and C3 are also normalized so that a one percent shock corresponds toa one percent change in
the corresponding multiplier component.
All models that contain a demand function for real money balancesalso contain, implicitly or
explicitly, equations similar to the above. Combining these equations, we obtain the relationship that the
difference between the growth rates ofthe adjusted monetary base and ofthe price level in this economy
depends on the (net) elasticity of the combined money demand and supply process with respect to market
interest rates and real output, the first two righthand side terms below, plus the shocks that hit the
~‘ Although our analysis is framed in terms ofa money multiplier/monetary base paradigm, we have in mind a
general equilibrium framework of the type discussed by Tobin (1961) and, in several papers, by Brunner and
Meltzer: see Anderson and Rasche (1982) and Anderson. Johannes and Rasche (1983).Anderson andRasche, “Defining theAdjusted Monetary Base...” WorkingPaper 96-014 11
economy, the third righthand side term:
IAMB dP rPL. k. el dY
AMB p[~’ ~
Idc, dc~ d*~ +1—— E (m,k)—— E(m,e)—
[C, C~
This equationties together growth ofthe economy’s pricelevel and growth ofthe (endogenous)adjusted
monetary base, conditional on the economy havingademand function for real balanceswith stationary
disturbances.’7 Under an interest rate-pegging monetary policy, di= 0.
Within thisframework, considerthe impacteffect of an exogenous shock (otherthan one ofthe
includedshocksC., i= I ,...,3) with the nominal interest rate pegged by the central bank (di = 0). Under
these conditions, the relationship between movement in the adjusted monetary base andthe price level is
dAMB dP dY
AMB
If C (k,Y) 0 then 0< [C (L,Y)— C (m,k) (k,Y)]. If the latter term is close to 1.0, then the
percentage response ofthe adjusted monetary base is agood indicator ofthe percentage responseof
nominal income ~1+ . Ifthe impactelasticities ofthe demandfor real balancesand the
[Y P~j
currency/deposit ratio are close to zero, then the percentage responseof the adjusted monetary base is a
good indicator of the percentage response ofthe pricelevel. This indicator function is obscured when






7 See Hoffman and Rasche (1991), Hoffman, Rasche and Tieslau (1995) and Hoffman and Rasche (1996)Anderson andRasche, “DefiningtheAdjusted Monetary Base...” Working Paper 96-014 12
The long-runindicator property ofthe adjusted monetary base under the specified feedback
policy rule may be illustrated by considering steady-stateresponses under the assumptions that real
output changes are equal to the growth rate of natural output, p. , the real interest rate is stationary
around a mean, ir = ir0 +C4, andactual inflation is correctly anticipated. Then
dAMB dP [ k. e.l(dP
AMB P+LIlC(m~k)k+C(m~e)j~P+dE4










where p = L.~— C (m,k)~-+ C (m,e)~-.This relationship implies that, with astationary composite
Ic
disturbance, the average growth of the adjusted monetary base over longer periods will reflect (but not
necessarily equal) the average inflation rate. Central banks that seek to achieve price stability should
likely regard sustained near-term acc’~erations or decelerations ofthe monetary base with concern.
2. Broadeningthe Measure ofthe Monetary SourceBase
High-powered money equals the monetary liabilities ofthe monetary authorities (in the United
States, the Federal Reserve and the Treasury) to the rest of the economy. The monetary base includes
18 The stationarity of C, and C4 is examinedin Hoffman and Rasche (1996), and ofE4 in Crowder and Hoffman
(1996).Anderson and Rasche, “Defining the Adjusted Monetary Base...” Working Paper 96-014 13
part, but not all, of these liabilities. 19 The sourcesanduses ofhigh-powered money are shown in Table 1
for December 1995.
2.1 The SupplyofHigh-PoweredMoney
The largest factor supplying high-powered money is Reserve Bank credit (line I in Table I),
consisting of the assets ofthe 12 FederalReserve Banks. Reserve Bank credit varies directly with the
quantity ofgovernment andother securities held by the Federal Reserve, with Federal Reserve lending to
financial institutions, and with Federal Reserve float. The aggregate supply of high-powered money also
increases with the quantity of SDR (line 2) and gold certificates (line 3) owned by the FederalReserve,
and with the amount ofUS Treasury currency and coinoutstanding (line 4).
2.2 TheDemandforHigh-PoweredMoney andthe Monetary Base
Most ofthe high-powered moneysupplied by the Federal Reserve and the Treasury is
represented by currency in circulation and the deposits ofdomestic financial institutions at Federal
Reserve Banks; together,these constitute the monetary base.2°The current measure of the St. Louis
monetary base (line 6) equals the sum ofcurrency in circulation outside the Treasury and Federal
Reserve (line 6a)plus reserve balances of depository institutions (line 6b). Reserves balances is an
accounting concept intendedto measure the aggregate amount of depository institution reserves available
to support deposit expansion. Reserve balancesare measured by subtractingthe aggregate amount of
depocitory institutions’ required clearing balance contracts from their aggregate Federal Reserve
deposits. Uses of high-powered money otherthan as the monetary base (line 7) were about $25 billion in
December 1995.
~ The major uses of high-powered money excluded fromthe monetary base are the Federal Reserve deposits of
foreign central banks and ofthe U.S. Treasury. For discussion of some arguments for their inclusion and exclusion,
see Advisory Committeeon Monetary Statistics (1976). The term high-powered money as used in this section is
s1i~ht1y broader than the concept used by Friedman and Schwartz (1963).
Th,s concept also is widely referred to as simply the source base.Anderson and Rasche, “Defming the Adjusted Monetaiy Base...” Working Paper96-014 14
The revised measure ofthe monetary base recognizes the similarity between the FederalReserve
deposits classified as reserves balances(line 6b) and the Federal Reserve deposits classified as held to
satisfy requiredclearing balance contracts (line 7d). 21 Both categories ofdeposits are used by depository
institutions to settle interbank payments, and both types are available to satisfy legal reserve requirements
(albeit perhaps at the cost of failing to satisfy a required clearing balance contract). The revised measure
of the monetary base (line 8) equals the sum ofcurrency in circulation (line 8a) and all the Federal
Reserve deposits held by domestic depository institutions (line 8b). Including Federal Reserve deposits
putatively held to satisfy required clearing balance contracts increases the amount of Federal Reserve
deposits including in the base by about one-fourth, and increases measured total reserves ofdepository
institutions by 8 percent.
The demand for the monetary base may be separated into three parts: the public’s holdings of
hand-to-hand currency and coin, depository institutions’ holdings of vault cash, and depository
institutions’ holdingsof deposits atFederal Reserve Banks; the sum ofthe latter two items equals the
reserve component of the monetary base. Although strong foreign demand for U.S. currency has
complicated interpretation of the monetary base during the last decade, the revision discussed in this
paper changes only the reserve component ofthe base.
The Monetary Control Act of 1980 significantly changed the demand for Federal Reserve
deposits. Prior to the Act, almost all deposits at Federal Reserve Banks were held by member banks of
the Federal Reserve System.22 Banks used these balances both to satisfy reserve requirements and to
make payments on behalf ofcustomers. For most member banks, the latter came “free”: the amount of
reserves that they were required to hold against deposits was more than sufficient to satisfy any demands
arising from interbank payments (perhaps with some intraday Federal Reserve overdraft credit).
Nonmember banks and thrifts, lacking access to the Federal Reserve’s books for final settlement of
21 For further discussion, see Anderson and Rasche (1996),
2z Nonmember banks also held small amounts ofFederal Reserve deposits used for payments. as previously noted.Anderson and Rascbe, “Defining the Adjusted Monetary Base...” WorkingPaper96-014 15
payments, madeinterbank payments and settledchecks through correspondent accounts atmember
banks. TheAct madenonmember institutionssubject to Federal Reserve reserve requirements and, atthe
same time, gave them direct access to the payments system through reserve balance accounts. Since
reserve requirements were phased-in forthese institutions over an eight-year period, many initially (at
least) found their vaultcash more than sufficient to satisfy their new Federal Reserve reserve
requirements. The Act’s changes created a large setofdepository institutions with access to Federal
Reserve check clearing andother payments facilitiesbut little experience in reserve account
management. With the relatively low level ofreserve balance requirements during the during theAct’s
initial phase-in period, the possibilityandfrequency of overdrafts on reserve balance accounts became a
problem forsome institutions.23
During the early I980s, the FederalReserve required some depository institutions that used
Federal Reserve payments services to maintain required clearing balances, or levels of Federal Reserve
deposits above and beyond the amounts necessary to satisfy the institutions’ statutory reserve
requirements. Based on its payments activity and past management of its Federal Reserve account, an
institution negotiated with Federal Reserve Bank staffaminimum amount ofFederalReserve deposits
that it would maintain in addition to the amount ofdeposits necessary to satisfy its statutory reserve
requirement. (Required clearing balance requirements must be negotiated on an individual institution
basis becausethe MonetaryControl Actforbidthe FederalReserve from imposingablanket
supplemental reserve requirement for payments purposes, except in times ofemergency.) To offset the
cost of holding these balancesand make the requirement more palatable, the Federal Reserve paidthe
institutions, at(approximately) the federal funds rate, “earnings credits” that could only be used to pay
for Federal Reserve priced services such as check clearing and wire transfers of funds.
23 Some institutions, newly subject to Federal Reserve reserve requirements, held very low levels ofFederal Reserve
deposits and encountered overdraft problems for two reasons. First, vault cash could be applied to satisfy reserve
requirements. Second, some institutions held relatively small amounts oftransaction deposits relative to totalAnderson andRasehe, “Defining the Adjusted Monetary Base WorkingPaper 96-014 16
During the mid-1980s, andespecially following the February 1984 shift to contemporaneous
reserve accounting, an increasing numberofinstitutionsrealized that theycould simplify their reserve
management by voluntarily agreeing to maintain a required clearing balance. Maintaining voluntarily a
“required” clearing balance changes the expected costto the depository of satisfying its statutory reserve
requirements because the additional FederalReserve deposits provide an inexpensive cushion against
possible shortfalls relative to statutory reserve requirements. Deficiencies relative to the agreed upon
clearing balance impose little coston the institution while permitting itto use all its Federal Reserve
deposits to satisfy its statutory requirements; at the same time, the FederalReserve deposits used to
satisfy theclearing balance contract accumulate earnings credits atabout the federal funds rate.
The Federal Reserve deposits held to satisfy avoluntary required clearing balance contract act as
abuffer stock because, under FederalReserve accounting rules, balances in adepository’s Federal
Reserve account are applied first to satisfy its statutory required reserves and only thereafter to satisfy the
clearing balance requirement. Hence, when an institution’s Federal Reserve deposit balance fallsbelow
its expectation, the shortage is recorded in the Federal Reserve’s accounting system as adeficiency on a
clearing balance requirement ratherthan as adeficiency on astatutory reserve requirement (provided the
sum of vault cash and Federal Reserve deposits exceeds the institution’s required reserves). No penalties
are imposed for smalldeficiencies on voluntary clearing balance contracts, and larger shortfalls are
penalized atonly a2 or 4 percent annual interest rate.24 Deficiencies relativeto required reserves are
subject to significant penalties and “administrative counseling,” while comparable deficiencies relativeto
aclearing requirement are subject to minimal penalties. An institution that sometimes has been forced to
borrow at either the discount window or apenalty federal funds rate to cover reserve deficiencies may
find the required clearing balance account comforting.
deposits. and most nontransaction deposits were not subject to reserve requirements. See Federal Reserve Bulletin,
March 1981, pp. 247-49 and December 1982, p.756.
24 For discussions ofthe accounting rules, see Appendix 2 and Stevens (1993).Anderson and Rasche, “Defining theAdjusted Monetary Base Working Paper96-014 17
By 1985, about 4500 institutionshad clearingbalance contracts, totaling about $1-1/4 billion.
These numberswere about the same in the thirdquarter of 1990, before the December 1990 reduction in
reserverequirements on nonpersonal time deposits and certainother liabilities. Two years later, during
the thirdquarter of 1992, the amount ofcontracted required clearing balanceshad nearly tripled to about
$4-1/2 billion while the numberofinstitutions increased to about 4700 (see Figure l).25 More recently,
reductions in clearing balance contracts seem to be an adjustment margin fordepositories following
shifts in the stance ofmonetary policy: aggregate clearing balance contract amounts fell sharply
following the Committee’sdecision to increase its federal funds rate target in February 1994. Finally,
the accelerating spread ofOCD sweep programs since mid-1995 appears to have encouraged many
depositories to re-label their Federal Reserve deposits, previously heldto satisfy statutory reserve
requirements, as clearing balances.26
2.3Shouldclearingbalances be included in the monetary base?
The contracted required clearing balances of depository institutions are not currently included in
the published adjusted monetary base, as shown in line 6 of Table 1,27 We include requiredclearing
balances in our revised adjusted monetary base, shown in line 8, just as we include other Federal Reserve
deposits held by domestic depository institutions at Federal Reserve Banks.
Ourrevised measureofthe ofmonetary base is suggested by the definitions ofBalbach and
Burger(1976):
25 The actual amount of Federal Reserve deposits used to satisfy depository’s clearing balance contracts is not
available. Thesedata arethe minimal contracted amounts only.
26 In a sweep program, adepository reclassifies transactions deposits at theend ofthe business day as money market
deposit accounts (MMDA), the latter subject to a zero reserve requirement. By doing so, many large depository
institutions are able to satisfy their statutory required reserves with vault cash and need to hold Federal Reserve
deposits only to settle interbank debits such ascheck clearing and wire transfers; see Appendix 3. As ofMarch
1996, Federal Reserve Board staffestimated that about one-sixth of thedecrease in Federal Reserve deposits due to
sweep programs had been reflected in increased required clearing balances; see Kohn (1996).
27 Required clearing balances are included in the Board staffs monetary base not adjusted for changes in reserve
requirements, currently published on page 2 of the Board’s weekly H.3 release and in Table 1.20 of the Federal
Reserve Bulletin, but are excluded from the Board’s base adjusted for changes in reserve requirements and the St.
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“... (the monetary base) can therefore be identified in any monetary system by ascertaining and
summing the following:
1. those assets whichthe consolidated banking sector uses to settle interbank debt; and
2. those items, aside from bank liabilities, which are used as money.”
and ofthe AdvisoryCommission on Monetary Statistics (1976, p. 8):
“With respect to monetary aggregates, one basis fordefining such atotal is to regard
money as corresponding to assets that are generally used to discharge obligations and
that are not the explicit liability of nongovernmental entities in the society.
Traditionally, such assets havecorresponded to specie. In the United States today they
correspond primarily to the non-interest-bearing fiat issues ofthe ultimate monetary
authority. The terms “high-powered money” and “monetary base” have been used to
refer-tothis total. We shallrefer to it as “the base.”
“For the UnitedStates today the base includes all currency outside the Federal Reserve
andthe Treasury plus all bank deposits atFederal Reserve Banks.
Although broader thanthe old measure of the base that it replaces, the new revised measure
continues to exclude an important asset that these definitions suggest should be included: the amount of
intraday credit, in the form of FederalReserve deposits, used for payments activity. During 1994, such
intraday deposits averaged approximately$50 billion, or nearly twice the close-of-business-dayamount
ofFederalReserve deposits included in the monetary base; see Richards (1995), p. 1066. The major
barrier to inclusion of intraday deposits is the lackoftimely published data: close ofbusiness deposit
levels are published weekly on the BoardofGovernors’s H.4.I statistical release, while intraday credit is
notpublished in any release.28
The argument forthe inclusion ofrequired clearing balances also rests on several observations
regarding depository institutionsofFederalReserve deposits. First, so far as weare aware, contracted
clearing balances today are a voluntary commitment to maintain areserve balance at aFederal Reserve
Bank. Most of these balances are maintained in reserve accounts that are also used to satisfy legal
28 The revised measure of the base, like previous measures, excludesFederal Reserve deposits held by the U.S.
Treasury and by foreign central banks, included in lines 7b and 9b ofTable 1. These deposits are not used to make
interbank payments nor to discharge debts ofnongovernmental units; see Advisory Committee on Monetary
Statistics (1976).Anderson and Rasche, “Defining the Adjusted Monetary Base...” WorkingPaper96-014 19
reserve requirements against deposits, not as aseparatedeposit. For most institutions, the funds heldto
satisfyaclearing balance contract are available to make interbank payments in the same way as other
reserve balances. An institution maychange its clearing balance commitment, and its holdingsofreserve
balances, appropriate to its business needs.29 This suggests that reserve balancesheld to satisfy a
clearing balance contract are aclose substitute forother reserve balances. Second, when reserve
requirements were reduced in 1990-91, some institutions found that the level of reserve balancesrequired
against deposits was less than the amount desired forinterbank transaction activity. As aresult, they
increased their contracted clearing balance, Third, contracted clearing balances are not adistinct types
of funds. Rather, the reserve balances usedto satisfy clearing balance contracts are supplied by the
Federal Reserve via actions such as open market operations in the same way as other high-powered
money.
Including contracted clearing balancesin the adjusted monetary base is not without objection.
Some depository institutions seem to adjust the amount ofcontracted clearing balances inversely to
changes in the federal funds rate, seeking apparently to generate only enough earnings credits to payfor
theiruseofFederalReserve priced services. For these institutions, the demand forreserve balancesmay
be highly interest elastic andlargely unrelated to either liquidity management or lending decisions. If so,
some analysts have argued that required clearing balancesshould be excluded from the monetary base.
The macroeconomic analysis developed above shows, however, that thisargument has no
implications fordefinition or measurement ofthe adjusted monetary base. We noted in our illustration of
the adjusted monetary base as amonetary policy indicator that some components of the money
multiplier, such as k and e, are generally functions of economic variables such as interest rates and
income.30 It seems likely that inclusion of required clearing balances in the measureof the adjusted
monetary base will, in fact, increase the interest elasticity of the excess reserve ratio, e. Yet, the essential
29 However, Federal Reserve operating rules generally discourage changes more frequently than once a month, or
approximately every third or fourth maintenance period.Anderson andRasche, “Defining the Adjusted Monetary Base...” Working Paper 96-014 20
pointis that the roleofthe adjusted monetary base as an indicatorofthe stance ofmonetary policy is
independent ofthe sizeofthe elasticityofmultiplier components such askand ewith respectto variables
such incomeand interest rates.
The argument to support this conclusion is straightforward. The larger the average interest
elasticity ofthe excess reserve ratio e, the smaller the meanestimated sizeof the reducedform
multipliersforthe adjusted monetary base, all else equal. In models wherethe adjusted monetary base
satisfies the Blinder/Solow criterion, the reducedform multipliers of the underlying macroeconomic
model forchanges in both the monetary base dMB and reserve requirement ratios —Ddrare affected
proportionately by the size ofthe interest elasticity of the excess reserve ratio. Therefore, in such
models, the effect ofchanges in the interestelasticity of e areconfined to the scalefactor for the
monetary policy indicator variable, The size of the interest elasticityof the excess reserve ratio is
irrelevant to the definitionofthe scale variable.
3. Adjustinj~ the Monetary Base for Chanjj~es in Reserve Requirements
Measuring the extended monetary base requires amechanism formapping changes in reserve
requirements into “equivalent” changes in the quantity of base money demanded by depositories.
Combining the effects of reserve requirement changes with those from open market operations and
similar instruments is not asimple amatter. Open market operations, discountwindow lending and
foreign exchange market intervention all directly change the supply ofReserve Bank credit by changing
the quantity ofassets (securities or loans) held by the FederalReserve Banks. Reserve requirement
changes alter the demandfor Reserve Bank credit.
The adjusted monetary base published by Andersen and Jordan (1968) includedan adjustment
for “... reserves released by changes in reserve requirements”. The adjustment, constructed as suggested
by Brunner (1961), added to the monetary base ateach date the cumulative dollaramount by whichpast
~° For empirical evidence, see Anderson and Rasche (1982) and Anderson. Johannes and Rasche(1983).Anderson and Rasehe, “Defining the Adjusted Monetary Base...” Working Paper 96-014 21
changes in reserverequirements hadchanged the level ofrequired reserves. Although each change in
reserve requirements was viewed as absorbingor liberating acertaindollar amount ofrequiredreserves,
these amounts depended only on the amount of reservable deposits on the date ofthe reduction: they did
not vary in later periods with changes in the levels ofreservable deposits.
In 1977, Burger and Rasche (1977) showed that Brunner’s adjustment was inadequate because it
did not consider the amount by whichp~reductions (increases) in reserve requirements reduced
(increased) abank’s current required reserves.They showed that an adjustment that varies with deposit
levels is necessary for the adjusted monetary base to removethe total effect of the change in reserve
requirements from the monetary base multiplier (and no more). They proposed that the adjusted
monetary base be measured as the sum of the source base andatime-varying reserve adjustment
magnitude (RAM), amethodology that has generally been maintained in subsequent revisions ofthe St.
Louis adjusted monetary base. Since 1980, the adjusted base has included a modification of the Burger-
Rasche reserve adjusted magnitude dueto Gilbert (1980, 1987).
The substantial changes in the structure of reserve requirements that haveoccurred since 1980
suggest that the methodology introduced by Burger and Rasche needs reexamination. Here, we formalize
their analysis by considering a model with two classes of institutions. Institutions in the first class
resemble the membercommercial banks considered by Burgerand Rasche. For these institutions, the
total quantity of required reserves generally exceeds their vault cash, and legal reserve requirements play
an important role in determining theirdemand forbase money. Institutions in the second class find legal
reserve requirements much less influential in their portfolio allocation decisions. Often, their level of
required reserves is less than their vault cash and, hence, they are not legally required to hold any reserve
balances at Federal Reserve Banks. Their demand for reserve balances depends largely on their need to
make inter-bank payments in immediately available funds on the books of the Federal Reserve Banks,
and perhaps on Federal Reserve restrictions regarding daylight overdrafts on their reserve accounts.Anderson and Rasche, “Defining theAdjusted MonetaryBase...” Working Paper 96-014 22
3.1 MonetaryBase Multipliersbefore 1980
We begin withamodel that reflects the institutional environmentbefore the Monetary Control
Actof 1980. Since ourpurpose is to illustrate the dependence ofthe RAM adjustment on the distribution
ofdeposits among differentclasses ofdepository institutions, we separate member and nonmemberbanks
more explicitly than previous authors.3’ We assume (1)a centralbank that issues two liabilities, currency
Cu and reserve balances (deposits) RB, and(2) two types ofdepository institutions, indexed by
superscripts M andN (corresponding to member banks and to nonmemberbanks and thrifts,
respectively), that issue demand D = DM + DN and time T = TM + 7~,deposits. The two types of
depositories are dissimilar in four characteristics:
• type M institutions are subjectto central bank reserve requirements against deposits that may be
satisfied by holding either vaultcash or reserve balances at the central bank;
•government deposits are onlyattypeM institutions;
•type Ninstitutions hold deposits at typeM institutions but not vice versa;
• type N institutionsare not permitted to hold deposits at the central bank.
but similar in two others:
•both types of institutions hold vaultcash to satisfy reserve requirements and/or to convertdeposits into
currency on demand;
•both types of institutions issue deposits that the nonbank public regards as perfect substitutes.
We assume that transaction among banks, the government andthe nonbankpublic are settled in
terms ofcurrency Cu, demand deposits held by the government at type M depositories DZ, demand
~ Burger (197l)provides a similar analysis without as explicit a separation of differentclasses of institutions.Anderson and Rasche, “Defining theAdjusted Monetary Base...” WorkingPaper96-014 23
deposits held by the nonbankpublic attypeMand Ndepositories, D~and D respectively, and
demanddeposits held by typeN attypeM depositories,D. (Throughout, superscripts refer to the
owner ofthe deposit and subscripts to the issuer ofthe deposit.) Define D “ = + D and
DM = + + D1~, and note that D” = DM + — — D~.The FederalReserve imposes legal
reserve requirements against demand DM and time TM deposits at rates ~ and rT, respectively, such that
the required reserves of atype M institution are RR = r°DM+rTTM 32 These must be satisfied by
holding either vault cash or areserve balance (deposit) atthe centralbank.
The monetary base multiplier in this model is easily derived. Suppressing time subscripts, the




where (r’~DM+ rTTM) are the required reserves of typeM institutions,
kD”is currency held by the nonbank public,
VCM and VCN are vault cash held by typeM and N institutions, respectively,
RBare the reserve balance deposits held by type M institutionsat the central bank,
d --~- t --~- —-~~ d VCM+RB~r’3DM~rTTM MDP~ MDP~ VN— ,an eM—
The term (VCM± RB — r’~DM — rTTM) equals the amount of high-powered money -- vault cash plus
reserve balances -- held by typeM institutionsabove and beyond their required reserves.
32 Historically, some nonmember banks and thrifts faced state-imposed reserve requirements that had to be satisfied
with holdings of vault cash, deposits in other banks, U.S Treasury bills orcertain other liquid securities. See GilbertAndersonand Rasche, “Defining theAdjusted Monetary Base Working Paper 96-014 24
For clarity, it may be usefulto relate the reserve constructs in our model to currently published
Federal Reserve Boardreserve concepts, which differ from those ofthe Federal Reserve Bank of St.
Louis by excluding surplus vaultcash from the definitionofexcess reserves. For an individual
depository institution i,
• if VC~M> (r°DI,M+ rlM), thenthe difference (VCIM — rDDIM + rl~) is referred to as
surplus vault cash.If VC,M (r’~DjM+ r1~), then surplus vault cash is zero. In either case,
VCLM is referred to as applied vault cash.
• If VCIM > (r’3DIM + rlM) and RBIM > 0, then RBIM — RCBIM is referredto as excess
reserves, where RB~M are the total reserve balances held by depository institution iatthe Federal
Reserve and RCB~M is the amount of its required clearing balance contract (if any). Note that
RCBIM may be zero, and RB~M — RCB~M may be negative. If RBIM — RCB~M = 0, then excess
reserves equals zero even though surplus vault cash is greater than zero.
• If VC,M <(r”DIM ±rT7M), then RB~M — RCBIM — (r’3Dj,M + rlM — VC,,~)is excess
reserves.
Data on total andexcess reserves currently published by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System include applied vault cash and reserve balances (= Federal Reserve deposits less the nominal
amount of required clearing balance contracts) but omit surplus vault cash and an amount ofFederal
Reserve deposits equal to depository institution’s required clearing balance contracts. ~ Reserve
measures currently published by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, as of March 1996, include
surplus vault cash but also subtract required clearing balance contracts.
(1978), Gambs and Rasche (1978), and Gilbert and Lovati (1978),
°See table 1.20 in the Federal Reserve Bulletin or the Board’s weekly H.3 statistical release.Anderson and Rasehe, “DefiningtheAdjusted MonetaryBase WorkingPaper 96-014 25
The monetary base multiplier forMl is straightforward
Mi =Cu+D1” =(1±k)D’°
(1+k) 1MB





~rDdM +rtM +k±vN+eM i
=m2MB
where t =(M2—M1)/ D” (TM± TN)!D”.
The objective of the reserve adjustment to the monetary base (RAM) is to mapthe effects of
changes in reserve requirement ratios into an adjusted monetary base (AMB = MB + RAM) such that the
multipliers m,(r’~, rT,k,eM,t, tM,dM,vN) and m2(r’~, rT, k,eM,t,tM,dM, vN) are (approximately)
invariant to changes in the legal required reserve ratios r’~and rT. At the same time, the adjustment
should notchange the response of the multipliers to other arguments in the functions that reflect the
behaviorofdepository institutions orthe nonbank public. The adjusted monetary base and adjusted
monetary base multiplier (m,~)forMl are defined as
Mi = m,b(MB+ RAM) = m,hAMB
where AMB is the adjusted monetary base, m,h D T + k) , andr~and roT are the
t~dM± r0 tM +k + VN ±e~
reserve requirement ratios on transaction and time deposits in achosen base period, respectively. The
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RAM = {(r’~ — rD)d ±(rT
— rT)t}DP
maps the change in required reserves dueanychange in reserve requirement ratios since the specified
base period into an equivalent change in the monetary base.
The M2 multiplier for the adjusted monetary base is
M2 = in2hAMB= in
2
b (MB + RAM)
or
[l±k±t}D’~ = m2b[r1 dm ±ar~Ttm +k+v~ +em]D” ±m2b[(rO rT)d +(roT — rT)t]DP
Therefore
(l+k+t)
= ro°dm± rTt ±k±v~+ em
which is invariant to changes in the legal required reserve ratios rD and r~’
The above analysis maybe extended to the case where typeM institutions(those subject to
central bank reserve requirements) issue i = (1 I) classes oftransaction deposits andj = (l,...,J)
classes oftime deposits, each with possibly different reserve requirement ratios. Let ~ Mi = -~t~- and
Mj = .~- be the ratios ofthe nonbank public’s holdings ofdemandandtime deposits in the ith and,jth
reserve classifications, respectively, at type M depository institutionsto their total holdings ofdemand
deposits. Then aggregate required reserves are
[~~Mi +~~J~MiJDP




Note the presence of base period reserve ratios for each class ofdeposit, r~0 and r~0, in the
denominator. The corresponding reserve adjustment magnitude is
~ --
Finally, as acavaet and extension to earlier remarks, note that the RAM adjustment does not
make~llmoney and credit multipliers invariant with respect to changes in statutory reserve requirements.
Considerthe bank credit (BC) monetary base mBc multiplier ofBrunner andMeltzer (1968), defined as
BC= m8~MB.In our notation,
m (i±t)_(F;Ddm±T,Ttm±em+vn) BC rtDdm±r,Ttm+k±em±vn
(see equation A.8, p. 32, Brunner and Meltzer (1968)). Let the bank credit-adjusted monetary base
multiplier be defined as
BC = mBCbAMB = mBCh[MB± RAM].
Then:
[(I + t) — (t°d ±i~,Tt,,,±em + v~ )}D’~ = mfiCh[rf~ + iTt ±em + v,,ID~ + mBch[ro — ,D)d + (i~T— rT)t ID”
so
— (l±t)~(i;°dm +!Ttm ±em+v~)
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which is ~ invariant to change in legal required reserve ratios r’3 and rT. Thus in models in which
intermediated (bank) credit providesachannel of monetary policy independentofthat provided by
monetary aggregates, the adjusted monetary base defined above is not an adequate indicator variable for
the stance of monetary policy.
3.2AdjustingforReserve Requirement Changes with “Economically Nonbound”Institutions
For periods prior to late 1980, depository institutionsare easily separated into two groups based
on their holdings ofbase money (vault cash and reserve balances). Member banks held vault cash, were
subject to Federal Reserve reserve requirements, and generally held reservebalances at FederalReserve
Banks. Nonmember banks and thrifts held vaultcash and were not eligible to hold reserve balances
directly, although they often held them indirectly through correspondent member banks.
Studies ofthe adjusted monetary base conducted prior to 1980 generallyassumedthat member
banks would change their holdings ofbase money about dollar-for-dollar followingachange in Federal
Reserve reserve requirements. During that period, member banks held few excess reserves and most
banks likely faced required reserve ratios sufficiently high to constrain their portfolio allocation
decisions.34 Banking analysts paid little attention to payments issues. It seemed generally to be assumed
that either banks’ reserve balances were more than adequate to service anydebits against their reserve
accounts, or the Federal Reserve would supply adequate intra-day credit. Time deposits, with the
exception of large negotiable certificates of deposit, were subject to effective Regulation Q interest rate
ceilings. Banks and the public were likely sufficiently constrained that other multiplier components (such
~ In 1977 required reserve ratios at member banks ranged from a minimum ofseven percent on the first two million
of netdemand deposits to 16.25 percent on netdemand deposits in excess of 400 million dollars. The required
reserveratio on savings deposits was three percent and the reserverequirements on timedeposits maturing in less
than 180 days were three percent on thefirst five million dollars and six percent on time deposits in excess of five
million dollars. (Federal Reserve Bulletin, December, 1977, p. A9)Anderson and Rasche, “Defining theAdjusted Monetary Base...” Working Paper96-014 29
as the ratio oftime and savings deposits to transaction deposits) were unaffected by changes in legal
reserve requirements ratios on deposits.
Under this regime, the total base money demanded by depositories equaled the sum ofrequired
and excess reserves held by member banks, and vault cash held by otherdepositories. Since member
banks applied essentially all their vault cash to satisfy reserve requirements and required clearing
balances were approximately zero, excess reserves at memberbanks equaled the difference between their
reserve balances and the portion of their required reserves not satisfied by vaultcash, or
ERM = RBM — (r’~DM + rTTM — VCM) . Excess reserves for the banking system as a whole equaled the
sum of excess reserves at member banks and vault cash at nonmemberbanks VCN, and the average
ERM+VCN
aggregateexcess reserve ratio was e = eM + VN =
Today’s environment is considerably different. The Monetary Control Act extended reserve
requirements to all depository institutions, reducedto zerorequired reserves on savings and personal time
deposits, and significantly reduced other reserve requirements on memberbanks. During December 1990
andJanuary 1991, required reserve ratios on nonpersonal time deposits and Eurodollar liabilities were
reduced to zero for all depository institutions. In April 1992, requiredreserve ratios on transaction
deposits were reduced to 10 from 12 percent.35 Depository institutions also gained greater freedom to
adjust their mix of reservable and nonreservable deposits during the during the I980s following the end
of Regulation Q ceilings on deposit offering rates.
After the Monetary Control Act, many depository institutions found that their vault cash,
although largely held for retail business reasons, also satisfied their reserve requirements.36 In the
~ In 1995, the required reserve ratioon the first $3.8 million of net transaction deposits is zero (the so-called reserve
exemption amount), and only three percent on the next $51 million (the low reserve tranche). The cutoff for the low
reserve tranche ischanged annually.
~ Reserve requirements were increased from zero on all depository institutions which were not member banks. The
full imposition ofreserve requirements on these institutions was phased in over the period 1981-87.Anderson and Rasche, “Defining theAdjusted Monetary Base WorkingPaper96-014 30
Federal Reserve System, depository institutionsthat fullysatisfy their required reserves with vault cash
are known as “nonbound”institutions;other institutionsare known as “bound” institutions. In this
article, we refer to these groups ofinstitutions as L-NonboundandL-Bound, respectively. Table 2 shows
the percentage distribution ofL-Bound andL-Nonbound depository institutionsamongdepositories
reporting data to the FederalReserve for selected years from 1981-95. (The rows labeled E-Bound and
E-Nonboundare explained later.) PartAof the table includes only institutionsthat reported data weekly,
while Part B includes institutionsthat reported quarterly andannually.~ In mid-1983, afterthe initial
phase-in of the Monetary Control Act, about 40 percent of the total deposits at weekly reporting
institutions were held in L-nonbound institutions; for all reporting institutions shown in Part B, about 43
percent of deposits were held by L-nonbound institutions. By mid-1989, the proportion of total deposits
held by L-nonbound weekly reporting institutions had fallen to about 18 percent (in Part A), and to about
25 percent for all L-nonbound reporting institutions (Part B). The 1990-91 reduction in reserve
requirements increased the proportion of total deposits at L-Nonbound weekly reporting institutions to
about 27 percent in 1991. We regard L-Nonbound institutions as facing no effective reserve requirement
constraint, in the precise sensethatthey seem unlikely to change their portfolio mix of assets in response
to a change in reserve requirements. Alternatively stated, the marginal reserverequirement tax rate on
such depository institutions is zero.
The amount ofvault cash held by nonbound institutions in excess ofreserves required against
their deposits is known as “surplus vault cash”. Surplus vaultcash is “surplus” only in the sense that
some part ofthe bank’s vaultcash is not used to satisfy legal reserve requirements. Since these balances
reflect voluntary portfolio choices ofthe managers ofdepository institutions, they presumably are the
desired cash holdings for the anticipated transaction of those institutions and are not surplus in any
economic sense of aportfolio disequilibrium. (Surplus vault cash is included in the St. Louis’ adjusted
~ Data for weekly reporters are the first complete reserve maintenance period in July of the specified year. For
quarterly and annual reporters. June data are used.Anderson and Rasche, “Defining the Adjusted Monetary Base...” Working Paper96-014 31
monetary base and is also included in the monetary base, not adjustedforreserve requirement changes
and not seasonally adjusted,published by the staffofthe Board ofGovernors. As noted above, it is
excluded from the monetary base adjustedforchanges in reserve requirements published by the Board
staff.)
Historical data on surplus vault cash is shown in Figure 2. Before 1959, vault cash could not be
used to satisfy reserve requirements and all vault cash was “surplus”. Surplus vault cash decreased
sharply during 1959-60 when Federal Reserve member banks were gradually allowed to apply vault cash
toward satisfying required reserves. The percentage ofvaultcash eligible to satisfy required reserves
increased linearly atthe rate of one-twelfth per month, reaching 100 percent in December 1960. From
1961 to 1981, surplus vaultcash equals the vault cash held by nonmember banks andthrift institutions,
since virtually all vault cash atmember banks was applied to meet reserve requirements. Surplus vault
cash grewrapidly during the I970s as the fraction of banks who were members of the Federal Reserve
System declined. Although the Monetary Control Actextended reserve requirements to all depository
institutions, the requirements were phased in during 1980-1987. Duringthese years, surplus vault cash
generallydeclined. In the later 1980s, the average amount of surplus vaultcash remained quite constant
but exhibited substantial seasonal fluctuation.
L-Bound institutions, holding vault cash less than or equal to required reserves, also may not be
constrained by legal reserve requirements. Although legally bound in the sensethat their required
reserves exceed their vaultcash, some ofthese institutions (particularly smaller institutions) may be
“economically nonbound” in the same sense as institutions that hold surplus vault cash: legal reserve
requirements against deposits may not be an important factor in their portfolio decisions. In this paper,
we denote such economically nonbound institutions as E-Nonbound, and other institutions -- for which
reserve requirements are binding in the traditional sense -- as E-Bound.Anderson and Rasehe, “Defining the Adjusted Monetary Base...” WorkingPaper96-014 32
How might the portfolios of“bound” and “nonbound” institutions change when reserve
requirement ratios change? The ordinary business ofadepository institution places some restrictions on
its response. Generally, the institution must maintain adequate stocks of vaultcash to convert customer
deposits into currency and ofreserve balances to make interbank payments. However, both constraints
are somewhat flexible. There is an intraday market in vault cash, atleast within larger cities, suggesting
that a bank might request that acustomer seekingalarge amount of cash wait until later in the day when
adequate currency can be obtained from the Federal Reserve or a correspondent. Some banks require
customers planning to withdraw asignificant amount of currency to provide atleast onebusiness day’s
notice. It also isnot uncommon forATM machines to run out of currency. For reservebalances, there is a
national secondary market, the federal funds market. For interbank payments, the Federal Reserve may
delay an interbank payment ifit exceedsapplicable daylight or overnight overdraft limitations. Since a
failure to convertadeposit into currency orto make arequested interbank payment maydamage a
customer relationship,adepository cannot be indifferent to the mix ofvault cash and reserve balances
that it holds.
In the caseof E-Bound institutions, changes in reserve requirements within the range where the
requirement remains an effective constraint should allow aportfolio adjustment oftotal reserves (total
base money) close to onedollarforeach dollar change in required reserves, leaving “excess reserves”
almost unchanged. If all institutions are “economically bound”, then the aggregate excess reserve ratio, e,
should be almost unaffected by the change in reserve requirement ratios. The most famous historical
example of this type of portfolio response is the reaction of member banks to the increases in reserve
requirement ratios in 1936-37. Contrary to the expectations of Federal Reserve officials, major
reductions in the aggregate excess reserve ratio did not follow increases in reserve requirement ratios. 38
Surplus deposits at Federal Reserve Banks -- “excess”in a legal sense -- were an optimal portfolioAnderson and Rasche, “Defining theAdjusted Monetary Base...” Working Paper 96-014 33
decision by member banks, and were not excess in an economic sense. The reserve requirement ratios of
1935 were effective constraints on thebanking system.
In contrast, consider the portfolio response ofan “economically nonbound”depository institution
to achange in reserve requirement ratios. The business needs of the institution are the primary
determinant of its holdings ofbase money, not legal reserve ratios. The excess reserves of anonbound
institution will vary approximately dollar-for-dollarbut in opposite direction to the change in required
reserves,leaving their total reserves largely unaffected.
The behaviorofsurplus vault cash and required clearing balance contracts followingchanges in
reserve requirement ratios in 1990-9 1 and in 1992 suggest that a substantial proportion of depository
institutions are economically nonbound. Surplus vault cash, shown in Figure 1, increased sharply in
1991 following the reduction in reserverequirement ratios to zero from 3 percent on nonpersonal time
deposits and Eurodollar liabilities, suggesting that at least some depository institutions with surplus vault
cash wereeconomically nonboundduring 1990. Moredramatic perhaps was the sharp increase in
required clearing balance contracts in 1991,shown in Figure 1, likely dueatleast in part to replacement
of formerly “required” reserve balances with contractual required clearing balances. The increase in
required clearing balances occurred after several years of stability in the amountof such balances. The
aggregate data are also consistent, at least in part, with the alternative hypothesis that a large part of
contracted clearing balances are heldprimarily to defray the cost ofFederalReserve priced services.
Clearingbalances surged during 1991 and 1992 as an increased supply of high powered money by the
Federal Reserve caused sharp decreases in the federal funds rate, and then fell sharply during 1994 as the
federal funds rate rose.
38 SeeFriedman and Schwartz(1963), pp.521-34 for a discussion ofthe changes in reserve requirements and
documentation that the Fed anticipated that the increases in reserve requirement ratios would substantially reducethe
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IfE-nonbound institutions representa significant share ofthe monetary base held by depository
institutions, it is important to separate E-nonbound and E-boundinstitutions whenmeasuring the RAM
componentof the adjusted monetary base becausethe institutions will respond differently to changes in
reserve requirements. To makethe analysis more precise, consider an economy with two distinct groups
of depository institutions, both subject to Federal Reserve reserve requirements. Define economic excess
reserves as ER, = RB, — (r°D,+ rTl — Vç), i = (B,NB), where subscripts denote groups of
economically bound and nonbound institutions, respectively. Economically bound institutions are
assumed to change the amount ofhigh-powered money they demand (relative to reservable deposits)
about dollar-for-dollar when required reserves ratios change. For this group, changes in reserve
requirement ratios leave their excess reserve ratio e8
= approximately unchanged. Economically
nonbound institutions do not change the quantity of high-powered money they hold (relative to
reservable deposits) whenreserve requirements change. Their excess reserve ratio eNB = changes
in equal absolute amount but opposite direction to the reserve requirement ratio.
In section 2, we derivedthe RAM adjustment proposed by Burger and Rasche (prior to the
Monetary Control Act) fromadecomposition ofthe monetary base into the amounts of base money held




The analysis of this section suggests the usefulness of a similar decomposition between economically
bound and nonbound depository institutions for the period since implementation of the Act. In obvious
notation, the monetary base may be written asAnderson and Rasche, “Defining the Adjusted MonetaryBase...” Working Paper 96-014 35
MB=[r~B± rB’tB+rJ~ffl~NB + rNBt NB +k+e~ +eNB]D
The appropriate RAM forinclusion in the adjusted monetary base is then
RAM=[(r~O—r)öB+(rB~O rB)’EB]D.
Note that this RAIVI includes only deposits ateconomically bound institutions. In all essential aspects, the
treatment ofeconomically nonbound institutions in this RAM adjustment is analogous to the treatment of
nonmember banks in Burger and Rasche (1977). The adjusted monetary base may be written as
AMB= MB+RAM
+rBOtB ±rI~I~9ö NB +rNBt NB ±k+eB+eNBJD.




+rBOtB +eB)+(rNB~NB +rNB’tNB +eNB)
By assumption, e8 does not change when r0 or r0 changes becauseE-Bound institutions match
reductions in their required reserves due to changes in statutory reserve requirements about dollar-for-
dollar with reductions in their holdings of base money. In contrast, eNB is assumed to change when r~
or r,~change in such a way that r!.~öNB+ rNB tNB + eNB does not change.
To measure accurately thispost-Monetary Control Act RAM,it is necessary to determinethe
time-varying fractions oftransaction deposits, ö~ and time deposits, ‘t1 , that are held at E-bound
depository institutions. These measurements cannot be identified in aggregate data, and must be
obtained from data on individual financial institutions. Later in this article we present a statistical
analysis of individual bank data that allows us to develop criteria for separating E-bound and E-
nonbound institutions. Some of the results ofthat analysis are shown in Figures 3 and 4, and in Table 2.
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the 1990-91 reduction in reserve requirements, to about 500 institutions. The proportions oftransaction
and nontransaction deposits atE-bound institutions, shown in Figure 4, fell from peaks in 1990 to about
65 and 54 percent, respectively, following the 1990-91 reduction in reserve requirements. (Recall that
the reserve requirement ratio on time and savings deposits was reduced to zero in December 1990.) In
Table 2, the rows labeled “E-Nonbound” and“E-Bound” are asimilar separation of depository
institutions. In 1995, weestimate that only about 2 percent ofU.S. depository institutionswere E-bound,
or in other words, found statutory reserve requirements to be an important determinant oftheir business
decisions. Only deposits at these E-bound institutions are included in the newRAM adjustment forthe
St. Louis adjusted monetary base; see Anderson and Rasche (1996).
3.3 Time Deposit Ratiosand ReserveRequirement Changes
Our discussion ofRAM has focused to this point on the direct impact ofchanges in reserve
requirement ratios on the monetary base multiplier. Specifically, earlier in this article we developed the
concept ofthe adjusted monetary base as apolicy indicator by substituting into the total derivative of the
money supply function, dM = in c/MB+ MB din, the terms involving drfrom the total derivativeof
the multiplier din = ... — m dr +‘~~ . This derivation assumes that other ratios included in the
‘.,r+e+k)
multiplier are not affected by changes in the reserve requirement ratios, or that
= = —( ~ ). Our analysis above ofeconomically bound and nonbound banks suggested
dr ~‘r r+e+k
that the excess reserve ratio e might be a function of r fornonbound banks. In this subsection, we
explore whether the time deposit ratio t might also beafunction of r.
The end ofRegulation Q ceilings on deposit offering rates gave depository institutions, in
principle, the means to adjust their reserve position by changing the mixture of reservable and
nonreservable deposits. In a competitive market, absent legal interest rate ceilings,it seems reasonable to
expect that changes in reserve requirement ratios will affect the rates offered by economically-boundAnderson and Rasche, “Defining the Adjusted Monetary Base...” WorkingPaper96-014 37
institutions on differenttypes ofdeposits inacompetitive market. It furtherseems reasonable that
economic agents decide on how much wealth to hold in the form oftime deposits, in part, on the rates of
return offered on time deposits relativeto the other assets. If so, competitive pressures may havecaused
increases in offering rates on savings and time deposits relative to those on transaction deposits following
the Monetary Control Act. Similarly, the reduction to zero of reserve requirements on nonpersonaltime
deposits in January 1991 may have increased offering rates on largenegotiable CDs relativeto other
instruments. In both cases, this might have increased the ratio of time deposits to total transaction
deposits at economically bound institutions,‘t, ,that enters the adjusted monetary base multiplier. ~
Testing for ashift circa 1980 is difficult dueto Regulation Q controls. Datafrom the latter period
(1990-91) suggest, however, that banks likely do not alter offering rates in response to substantial
changes in reserve requirements. The spreadsbetween rates on large negotiable CDs and on Treasury
bills and commercial paper are shown in Figure 5. Although there is considerable variability from week-
to-week, there is no discernible trend. The spread ofCD rates over 3 and6 month Treasury bill rates
fluctuates around 50 basis points; the spread ofCD rates to commercialpaper rates fluctuates around
zero. Neither has any discernible spikes or shifts at the beginning of 1991 when the reserve requirement
ratio was reduced to zero on nonpersonaltime deposits. Hence, we do not include in RAM any
adjustment forpotential indirect effects ofreserve requirement changes on the multiplier via changes in
the time deposit ratio at economically bound institutions.
4. Mkroeconomic Evidence:Are Banks “Bound”by Reserve Requirements?
In this section, the reactions of commercialbanks to the December 1990 - January 1991 and
April 1992 reductions in reserve requirement ratios are examined in an analysis of variance (ANOVA)
~ The multiplierdiscussed here is for transaction money, Ml. Multipliers for the broader measures of money such
as zero maturity money. MzM, M2 and M3 include additional terms in their numerators which, in a more detailed
analysis. would be shown as components of thetime deposit ratio.r. For examples, see Rasche and Johannes (1985).Anderson andRasche, “Defining theAdjusted Monetary Base...” Working Paper 96-014 38
framework.4°The analysis seeks to quantify the different reactions oflegally bound (L-bound) and
legally nonbound (L-nonbound) banks, ofvarious sizes, to changes in statutory reserve requirements.
The goal ofthe analysis is to developaset ofcriteria that distinguish E-boundfrom E-nonbound
institutions, consistent with the construction ofRAM outlined above.
Officially, the terms bound (L-bound) and nonbound (L-nonbound) describe the reserve position
ofan individual depository institution duringa specific reserve maintenance period. For tractability in
statistical analysis, it is necessary to classify institutions, over anumber of maintenance periods, as being
either oftypeL-bound or type L-nonbound. Some small and medium size banks, forexample, tendto
frequently change categories, being L-nonbound in periods when retail cash demands are heavy andL-
bound in others, while larger banks tend to remain consistently in a single category. In our analysis, we
experimented with several criteria forclassifyingabank as typeL-bound or type L-nonbound, including:
(1) the bank was L-boundduring only the later maintenanceperiods in 1992; (2) the bank was L-bound
during only the initial maintenance periods in 1990; and, (3)the bank was L-bound in all maintenance
periods includedin our sample. All statistical inferences regarding the reaction of banks to changes in
statutory reserve requirements were robust to reasonable alternative criteria. Parts A and B ofTables 4, 5
and 6 below show comparative results based on cases (I)and (3), respectively.
Our size grouping ofbanks is broadly consistent with categories used in otherbanking studies.
Banks classified as L-bound are separated into four size classes-- small, medium, regional and large --
based on net transaction deposits, while L-nonbound banks are separated into only two, small and
medium; thereare too few larger nonbound banks foranalysis. The Monetary Control Actof 1990
established atiered system of reserve requirements wherein the first $25 millionof net transaction
deposits, the “low reserve tranche”, was subject to a 3 percent requirement while larger amounts were
subjectto a 12 percent requirement; initially $25 million, the low reserve tranche is indexed to the annual
growth of aggregate transaction deposits. We classify banks in our sample data as “small” if their
~° Because of the unsettled state of the thrift industry during this period, we exclude thrifts from the analysis.AndersonandRasehe, “Defining theAdjusted MonetaryBase...” Working Paper96-014 39
holdingsofnet transaction deposits did not exceed the low reserve tranche, or $41.1 million, during any
reserve maintenance period in the second halfof 1990.41 We classify banks in the “medium”category if
their average level of net transaction deposits during the second half of 1990 was greater thanthe low
reserve tranche but less than $135 million, in the “regional” category ifnet transaction deposits averaged
more than $135 million but less than $500 million, and in the “large” category if net transaction deposits
averaged more than $500 million.
Statistical inferences regarding the behavior of banks are robust to reasonable alternatives for
classifying banks into different size groups. The use ofthe low reserve tranche fordelineatingsmall
banks providesan importantcontrol in our analysis becausethe April 1992 change in requirement ratios
affected only banks with transaction deposits above the tranche. Results forthe medium andregional
groups are not sensitive to the precise cut-off selected to separate the groups becausethereare relatively
few banks with net transaction deposits between about $100 to $150 million. The $500 millioncut-off
places about 150 banks in our large category, similar to the group of largeweekly reporting banks
published by the FederalReserve.42 The estimated models shown belowalso are not sensitive to
inclusion or exclusion ofbanks that acquiredother institutions.
Summarizing our results, wefind that:
• L-Nonbound banks did not change their holdingsof base money (vault cash plus FederalReserve
deposits), relativeto transaction deposits,when re~rve requirements changed in 1990-91 or 1992.
These banks have chosen to hold enough vault cash to fully satisfy their reserve requirements. If
their vault cash holdings are primarilydetermined by their needs to convertdeposits into currency
on request, then their holdings of vault cash will likely be insensitive to changes in statutory reserve
requirements. The amount ofFederal Reserve deposits held by these banks(ifany), including
~° The Garn-St, Germain Act of 1982 created the reserve exemption amount, which is subject to a zero reserve
requirement. Originally $2.1 million of deposits, it also is indexed. SeeAnderson and Kavajecz (1994) or the
Federal Reserve System’s Regulation D, Reserve Requirements, for details.Andersonand Rasche,“Defining the Adjusted Monetary Base...” Working Paper 96-0 14 40
deposits held to satisfy required clearing balance contracts, is likely determinedprimarily by the
bank’s decision to purchase services such as check clearing andwire transferfrom aFederalReserve
Bank rather thanacorrespondent bank. Since these FederalReserve deposits are not necessary to
satisfy reserve requirements, the quantity should be insensitive to changes in reserve requirements.
• Small L-Bound banks changed their holdingsof base money somewhat in response to the 1990-91
reduction from 3 percent to zero of reserve requirements on time and savings deposits,but did not
respond to the 1992 reduction in the reserve requirement ratio to 10 from 12 percent. Small bound
institutionsdiffer primarily from small nonbound institutions (which are excluded from RAM) by
choosing to hold less vault cash relativeto transaction deposits than smallnonbound institutions,
thereby also choosing to satisfy the remainderoftheir required reserves with FederalReserve
deposits. Absent a fully worked out model of bank reserve management, it is difficult to conclude
what this might implyforthe institution’s response to changes in reserve requirements. One
possibility perhaps is that ifthe bank purchases services such as check clearing andwire transfer
from the FederalReserve rather thanacorrespondent, then its holdingsofFederal Reserve deposits
might be insensitive to changes in reserve requirements. The 1992 reduction in reserve requirements
affected only net transaction deposits above about $42 million, having (algebraically) no effect on
the required reserves ofbanks with net transaction deposits subjectto only a 3 percent marginal
reserve requirement andonlyaweak effect on moderate size banks that faceda 12 percent
requirement on only apart oftheir transaction deposits.
• Larger L-Bound banks responded strongly to the 1990-91 reduction and somewhat less strongly to
the 1992 reduction. For these banks, statutory reserve requirements force holding a level of Federal
Reserve deposits in excess ofthe amounts necessary for payments-related activities such as check
~ See Table I2 7in the Federal Reserve Bulletin.Anderson and Rasche, “Defining theAdjusted MonetaryBase...” Working Paper 96-014 41
clearing and wire transfer. Ifreserve requirements are binding foranygroup of banks, it must be for
these.
Our models seek to estimate the response ofbanks’ holdings ofbase moneyto changes in reserve
requirements. Measuring the amount of base money held by some nonmember institutions is
problematic, however. While all banks in our dataset report their daily holdings of vault cash to the
Federal Reserve, some nonmember banks do not hold Federal Reserve deposits directly in their own
name but rather hold them indirectly viaapassthrough contract with acorrespondent bank.43 In
addition, some nonmember banks hold Federal Reserve deposits both indirectly through acorrespondent
~ directly in their own account. We increased the Federal Reserve deposits reported by each ofthese
banks by the difference between its required reserves and its applied vault cash. At the same time, we
reduced each correspondent’s reported Federal Reserve deposits by the amount of its respondents’
required reserves charged against the correspondent’s Federal Reserve account. Given the data reported
by banks to the Federal Reserve, this is the only feasible method formeasuring the amount ofFederal
Reserve deposits held (indirectly) by banks with passthrough reserve contracts.
Summary statisticsforour sample ofbanks are shown in Table 3. The sample consistsof
commercialbanks that reported data weekly to the Federal Reserve from mid-1990 through the endof
l992.~Banks without data for all included reservemaintenance periods are omitted, as are banks
involved in mergers or acquisitions.45 The upper panel, Part A, and lower panel, Part B, of the table
° Nonmemberdepository institutions may contract with the Federal Reserve to satisfy their required reserves
(beyond vault cash) with Federal Reserve deposits held by an eligiblecorrespondent institution (a so-called
“passthrough”reserve contract). Nonmemberinstitutionsthatsatisfy required reserves via passthrough contract may
open an additional Federal Reserveaccount in their own name. Federal Reservedeposits in this second account may
be used to satisfy a required clearing balance contract but may not be used to satisfy required reserves. (Ofcourse,
the funds could be loaned via thefederal funds market to thecorrespondent.)
~ Oursample may underrepresent small depository institutions that are not required to report data weekly to the
Federal Reserve. We assume that virtually all ofthese institutions likely would be classified as economically
nonbound and excluded from the calculation of RAM. Fora discussion ofFederal Reserve datareporting
requirements, see Anderson and Kavajecz (1994).
~ Banks that acquire other depository institutions are permitted under theFederal Reserve’s Regulation D to phase-
out ofthe benefitof the acquired institution’s low reserve tranche during the following eight quarters. Hence, we
exclude all banks involved in acquisitions from our statistical analysis. All such banks are included in the calculationAndersonand Rasche, “Defining the Adjusted Monetary Base...” WorkingPaper96-014 42
show banks classified as L-boundandL-nonbound via two alternative schemes. In Part A, banks are
classified as L-bound ifthey were L-boundin 1992 H2, after both the 1990-91 and 1992 reductions in
reserve requirements; banks notclassified as L-bound are classified as L-nonbound, even ifthey were
bound during some reserve maintenance periods in 1990 and 1991. In Part B, banks are classified as L-
boundifand only ifthey were L-bound in every reserve maintenance period during 1990 H2, 1991 H2
and 1992 H2; otherwise, they are classified as L-nonbound. Applicationof the lattercriteria reduces the
numberofL-boundbanks from 1822 in part Ato 710 in part B, primarily by pushingbanks that are close
to being L-nonbound (or in other words, hold enough vault cash to fully satisfy their required reserves in
some maintenance periods) from the L-boundgroup in part A into the L-nonbound group in part B.~
Focusing on Part A of Table 3, the 1990-91 reduction in reserve requirements on nonpersonal
time and savings deposits reduced required reserves at small, medium, regional and largebanks by about
44, 19, 17 and 18 percent, respectively, after allowingfor increases in their net transactions deposits. On
average,these banks satisfied about one-halfoftheir required reserves with vaultcash (column 4)~47
Contracted clearing balancesincreased sharply from 1990 to 1992, aboutdoubling forthe smallest banks
and increasing by almost an order ofmagnitude forlargebanks.
4.1 A TraditionalFixed Effects ANOVA Model
In Table 4, we present traditional ANOVA fixed-effects regression estimates forthe effects of
changes in reserve requirements in 1990-91 and 1992 on the ratio
I vault cash + Federal Reserve deposits 1 ..
?~during the last 13 reserve maintenance periods an 1990, 1991
net transactions deposits j
and 1992, a total of 39 observations on each bank. The model is
ofRAM, wherewe allow forthis effect by adjusting the size ofthe tranche loss adjustment to reflect the tranche in
the base period, January 7, 1991; see Anderson and Rasche (1996).
46 The overall sample size also is smaller in Part B because 13 regional and large L-bound banks in PartA are
reclassified as L-nonbound in Part B. and dropped from theanalysis.Anderson and Rasche, “Defining theAdjusted Monetary Base...” WorkingPaper 96-014 43
y~jt=~ + ~ D~ (ct~ — aN) + ~ (?~ ~— X92)D~1+ ~ (‘y~ 113)D~ +~ D~, +
1=1 t=90 j=l
where ~ = the ratio ofbase money(vault cash plus FederalReserve deposits) to net transaction
deposits held by bank i in maintenance periodj in yeart, (i = 1,..., N), (j=l,...,l3), (t = 90 92).
= 1 forbank i,and=0 otherwise,
D,~1
= I in year t, and = 0 otherwise,
= 1 in maintenance periodj, and = 0 otherwise,
= I if banki hadaclearing balance contract in maintenance periodj ofyear t,
and is an assumed i.i.d.disturbance.
The dummy variables D,~’1index the relativeposition ofreserve maintenanceperiodj within the year,
with the first period in July each year being numbered “1” and the last period ofthe yearnumbered “13.”
As such, they absorb seasonal fluctuationsthat may differ in strength across banks. We interpret the
as representing the effects ofchanges in reserve requirements between 1990, 1991, and 1992, although as
dummy variables they may also pick up other year-specificeffects. Estimates presented in Parts A and B
of Table 4 correspond to the banks summarized in Parts A andB of Table 3. Because the estimates are
similar, wediscuss only theestimates shown in Part A. Standard errors reported in the table are Huber-
White robust estimates ofthe regression covariance matrix.
For all groups of banks, the null hypothesis of no significant year effects in the behavior of y~
is rejected. Consider, then, the regression results foreach groupof banks:
~ In December 1995, for example, required reserves of all depositories were $56.6 billion, ofwhich $37.5 billion
was satisfied with vault cash (H.3 release, April 25, 1996, Table 2).Anderson andRasche, “Defining theAdjusted Monetary Base...” Working Paper 96-014 44
Small L-Bound banks: The model estimates suggest astrong response to the 1990-9 1 reduction in
reserve requirements. To gauge the reasonableness of the estimated regression coefficient, an ex ante
projection ofthe size of the response ofthese banks maybe calculated from the data in Table 3 under the
null hypothesis that the banks are E-Bound, or in other words, that the banks will reduce their holdings of
base money about dollar-for-dollar with the reduction in their required reserves. About half ofthe
required reserves of these banks in 1990 was dueto net transaction deposits ($620 million) and about
half was dueto nontransaction deposits. Each categoryof deposits was subject toa 3 percent marginal
requirement,suggesting (absent the zero reserve requirement on the reserve exemption amount) that the
reduction to zeroofthe requirement on nonpersonaltime and savings deposits might be expected to
reduce the banks’ average ratioof base money to net transaction deposits by about one-half, relativeto its
1990 valueof0.056, or 0.028. The ANOVA effect is (A. ~ — A. 91) = 0.02 1 - 0.001 = 0.02, equal to the
estimatedcoefficient on the 1990 yeardummy less the coefficient on the 1991 yeardummy variable
(both A. ~ andA. ~ are estimated relativeto 1992 because D92 is omitted from the regression). The
ANOVA effect is close to the projected value.
The regression coefficient reported for 1991, A. 91’ measures the reaction of small L-bound
banks to the April 1992 reduction in the marginal reserve requirementon net transaction deposits from
12 to 10 percent. Because net transaction deposits at these banks were below the low reserve tranche,
their required reserves were unaffected by the change. The estimated ANOVA effect, 0.0006, is about
zero, as expected.
Medium L-Bound Banks: These results are similar to those for small bound banks. A projection of the
reduction in their ratio ofbase money to net transaction deposits may be calculated from Table 3 under
the null hypothesis that the banks are E-Bound both before and after the change in the legal requirements.
About three-fourths of the required reserves of these banks were due to net transaction deposits in 1990,Anderson andRasche, “Defining theAdjusted Monetary Base...” WorkingPaper96-0i4 45
andtheir total required reserves averaged about 8.1 percentoftheir net transaction deposits. Thus,
reducing to zero the reserve requirement on nonpersonal time and savings deposits seemslikely to reduce
their overall ratio of required reserves andbase money holdings, relative to net transaction deposits, by
about one-fourth.
The estimated effect of the 1990 reduction is (A. ~ — A. ~)= 0.017 - 0.003 = 0.014, equal again to
the coefficient on the 1990 yeardummy less the coefficient on the 1991 yeardummy variable. The effect
is economically significant, although smaller in size than adollar-for-dollar reduction in base money
relative to the decrease in reserve requirements.
The effect of the 1992 reduction, while statistically significant with such alargesample, is only
0.003, less than 15 percent ofthe 0.02 change in the marginal statutory reserve requirement ratio. This
estimate suggests that banks in this size range reducedtheir holdings of Federal Reserve deposits little, if
at all, in response to the lower reserve requirement. Some evidence is found of adifferential response by
banks that had requiredclearing balance contracts: banks without such contracts are estimated to have
reduced their holdings ofbase money more than banks with such contracts. This seems consistent with
our conjecture that required clearing balances are, for some banks at least, a low cost type of excess
reserves. Further, banks with requiredclearing balance contracts likely are purchasing payments-related
services from the Federal Reserve andneed sufficient FederalReserve deposits to avoid overdrafts.
Overall, for the small and medium bound banks, the estimated coefficients for the 1990-91
reduction are economically significant and the coefficients forthe 1992 reduction are not. The
insignificance of the latter coefficient for small banks is expected, since their marginal reserve ratio
remained unchanged at 3 percent. While the 1992 year effect for the medium bound banks is statistically
significantly greater than zero, its smallsize makes it difficult to attribute the effect to changes in the
marginal reserve requirement ratio. This result also might reflect in part the lower federal funds rate thatAnderson andRasche, “Defining theAdjusted Monetary Base Working Paper 96-014 46
prevailed during 1992 relative to 1991. Below, wecompare their responses to the responses of similar
legally nonbound banks.
As aresult ofthisanalysis, small and medium-sizeL-Bound depository institutionsare assumed
to be E-Bound prior to January 1991 and are included in RAM through December 1990, but are assumed
to be E-nonbound beginning January 1991 and are excluded from RAM. With the exclusion of these
depository institutions, only about 5-1/2 percent of weekly reporting institutions, and2 percent of all
institutions (see Table 2), are included in the revised RAM adjustment for the St.Louis adjusted
monetary base.
Regional andLarge L-Bound Banks: On balance, banks in these groups are estimated to have responded
significantly to both the 1990-91 and 1992 reductions, or in other words, are E-Bound. Required
reserves against net transaction deposits were about 83 percent of these banks required reserves in 1990,
and their ratios of aggregate required reserves to net transaction~dèpositswere about 12.2 and 13.9
percent, respectively. Ifthe 1990-91 reductions were reflected fully in reducedholdings ofbase money,
we would project an effect ofmore than0.02. The ANOVA effect for regional banks, (A. ~ A. 9J) =
0.032 - 0.013 = 0.019, and for large banks, (A. 90—A. 91) = 0.036 - 0.013 = 0.023, are almost precisely
what would occur ifthese banks hadreduced their holdings ofbase moneydollar-for-dollar with the
reduction in their required reserves.
In contrast, both groups ofbanks seem to have responded to the April 1992 reduction in reserve
requirements by reducing their holdings of base moneyless than proportionately. The estimated
coefficients A. 92 for regional and large banks, both 0.013 and 0.013, are statistically significantly greater
than zeroand less thanthe reduction in the marginal statutory requirement of0.02. Banks with required
clearing balance contracts again are estimated to have reduced their holdings of base money less than
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rate during 1992 likely attenuated the reduction in FederalReserve deposits that otherwise would have
followed the reduction in reserve requirements. In addition, the smaller size ofthe estimated coefficient
(relative to the 0.02 reduction) likely reflects some largebanks becoming economically-nonbound
following the 1990-9I and 1992 reductions.~
Small and Medium-size L-Nonbound Banks: Estimates forL-Nonboundbanks suggest economically
insignificant responsesto changes in reserve requirements since 1990. Again, aprojection of the
potential effect ofthe 1990-91 reduction in reserve requirements maybe made from the data in Table 3.
Required reserves against nontransaction deposits were about 40 and 30 percent, respectively, ofthe total
required reserves ofthese banks in 1990. The average aggregate ratio of required reservesto net
transaction deposits atthese banks was 4.1 and6.2 percent, respectively, suggestingthat these banks ratio
ofbase moneyto net transaction deposits mightdecrease by as much as 1.8 percent. The ANOVA
effects ofthe reduction (0.006 for small banks and 0.003 for medium banks) are fairly similar in size and
less than one-third of the projectedchange. Considering the generally lowerfederal funds rate that
prevailedduring thisperiod, it seems difficultto attribute the change in these banks’ holdings ofbase
money (relative to net transaction deposits) to changes in legal reserve ratios.
Like small and medium L-Bound banks, small and medium L-Nonboundbanks did not respond
to the 1992 reduction in the reserve requirement on net transaction deposits. The estimated ANOVA
effects are not economically differentthan zero.
4.2 AnANOVAModel with Idiosyncratic Bank-Year Interactions
The ANOVA model shown above includes a single fixed effect foreach bank,a ~,andassumes
that the response ofall banks to the changes in statutory reserve requirements is the same, measured by
A. ~ and A. 9l~ Because it seems unlikely that all banks responded in the same way, weestimated a
~ See Feinman (1993) and Hilton, Cohen and Koonmen (1993).Anderson and Rasche, “Defining the Adjusted Monetary Base...” Working Paper 96-014 48
second ANOVA model that permits idiosyncraticresponses by each bank to the yeareffects:
N—I N 91 12
Yjj~.=~+>J~(a (U ~ ~ ig~)DqBtD~~j+~(Y ~—‘y 13)D,+~D~+E iii
1=1 1=! t=90 j=i
where is the same as above. This model becomes the same as the previous ANOVAifthe bank-year
effects are constrained to be equal for all banks during each year, or in other words,
N~=-A.1, t =90,91. In the ANOVA, the effect of the 1990-91 reduction in reserve
requirements is measured by ~ 1,91= ~— 1~1.92) - 1,91 — i~ i.92)~and the effect ofthe 1992
reduction by ~3 i91~ i,92~Distributions (histograms) of these individual bank yeareffects are shown in
Figures 6-8. Summary statisticsand hypothesis tests forthis model are shown in Table 5.~Although
Parts Aand B ofTable 5 show estimates under alternative L-bound classification criteria, we limit our
discussion to Part A. Figures 6-8 are based on the regressions summarized in PartAofTable 5.
The null hypothesis that therewas no change in the behavior of y~,across 1990, 1991 and 1992
is easily rejected by the F-statistics reported in Table 5. The estimated responses ofindividual small,
medium, regional and largeL-bound banks to the 1990-91 reduction in reserve requirement ratios are
shown, respectively, in panels Aand C of Figures 6 and 7. The paneltitles show the numberof estimates
plotted in each panel. On balance, L-boundbanks responded by significantly reducing their holdings of
base money: most of the shaded area in each distribution is well to the rightof zero(marked by avertical
line). Substantial variation in the responses of individual banks is evident in the figures, in part because
different banks held differentproportions of transaction and nontransactiondeposits (recall that the
dependent variable is the ratio of the bank’s base money holdings to its transaction deposits).
~ The ANOVA models areestimated with the GLM and REG procedure in SAS, version 6.11, on an HP Unix
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In contrast, the estimated response ofL-boundbanks to the April 1992reduction in reserve
requirement ratios, shown in panels B andDofFigures 6 and 7, is more varied. This latter change
reduced the marginal reserve ratio on transaction deposits to 10 from 12 percent, anddid notdirectly
affect small banks. Hence, as expected,the distributionforsmallL-boundbanks (panel B ofFigure 6) is
tightly centered about zero. In addition, medium-size L-boundbanks (panel D ofFigure 6) responded
weakly to the change,most commonly reducing their ratios ofbase money to transaction deposits by
about halfof what would be implied iftheyhad matched the decreasein required reserves dollar-for-
dollar. ~° For regional-sizebanks (panel B ofFigure 7), the ratio fell about 1-1/2 percentage points, close
to what would be projected from their average nettransaction deposits ofabout $280 million (see Table
3). Large L-boundbanks (panel Dof Figure 7) most commonly reducedtheir base money holdings by
about the full 2 percentage points.
The ANOVA effects forL-nonbound banks are shown in Figure 8. Because these banks satisfy
their entire statutory reserve requirement with vaultcash, weanticipate little reaction to the reductions in
reserve requirement ratios. Although there is some variety in individual bank effects, the distributions of
the effects forthe L-nonbound banks generally are symmetric about zero, forboth the 1990-91 changes
(panels A and C) and the 1992 change (panels B and D).
4.3 Repeated-MeasuresAnalysis ofVariance
The panel, or longitudinal, structureof ourdata requires attention to the implied covariance
structure ofthe data generating process. Eachbank is observed for 13 reserve maintenance periods in
each of 3 years, 1990, 1991 and 1992. As such, it seemsunlikely that the disturbances in the above
ANOVA models,C~,,are in factindependent and identically distributed as we assumed. Ifnot, the
~° Medium-size L-bound banks averaged about $80 million in net transaction deposits (see Table 3), the first $3.6
million subject to a zero reserve requirement ratio, the next $38.6 million to a 3 percentratio and, before the April
1992 reduction, the balance to a 12 percent ratio. Theirratio of base money to net transaction deposits would have
decreased by about a l percentage point ifthe banks had matched the reduction in their required reserves with a
dollar-for-dollarreduction in their holdings ofbase money.Anderson andRasche, “Defming the AdjustedMonetaryBase...” Working Paper96-014 50
coefficient estimates are unbiased and inefficient, while the estimated covariance matrix is biased and
inconsistent. An appropriate covariance structure likely would be block-diagonal, with aseparate block
foreach bank.
Atest forthe responses of depository institutionsthat is consistent with thiscovariance structure
maybe constructed by viewing the banks as ifthey were clinical subjects engaged in alaboratory
experiment. It is commonplace in clinical studies to measure certain characteristics of subjects both
“pre-treatment” and “post-treatment”, asking whether the change in the measurementforeach subject,
whenaveraged across all subjects, is statistically significant. Since thereare multipleobservations on
each subject,the models are widely referred to as repeated measures models.5’ In these models, the
repeated observationsforeach subject are treated as multiple time series, andthe disturbance is assumed
to be multivariate normal.
In our dataset, weobserve the ratio of base moneyto net transaction deposits foreach bank
during 13 reserve maintenance periods in each ofthree years: 1990, 1991 and 1992. In the repeated
measuresANOVA, the observations foreach yearare treated as 13 realizations of asingle time series
process; pooled across the threeyears, the observations are regarded as amultiple time series process
composedofthree univariateprocesses. The data for 1990-91 formapre- and post-treatment contrastfor
the 1990-91 reserve requirement reduction, andthe data for 1991-92 form asimilar contrast for the April
1992 reduction. Inferencesregarding the response ofbanks in various groups to the reserve requirement
changes are made by testing for the existence of significant interaction effects across years between (and
among) each individual year’s reserve maintenance period effects.
Repeated measures ANOVA results are shown in Table 6 and in Figures 9 and 10. Two tests are
shown in each of Parts A and B in the table. The first is based on an estimated multivariate ANOVA, or
MANOVA, model wherein the dependent variable is the vector [y~90y1,~91y1192]’, the explanatoryAnderson andRasche, “Defining the Adjusted Monetary Base...” Working Paper96-014 51
variables are dummy variables representing each reserve maintenance period andthe presenceofa
required clearing balance contract, andthe disturbance vectorforeach bank is assumedmultivariate
normal without any restrictions on its covariance matrix. The valueof Wilks’ lambda, amultivariate
analog ofmore familiarF-tests, suggests rejection ofthe hypothesis that coefficients on the period
dummy variables are the same in all threeequations. The second test shown in the table is based on an
estimated single-equation regression that includes interaction effects between the reserve maintenance
period dummy variables and yeardummy variables for 1990 and 1991 (relative to 1992). The null
hypothesis of no yeareffects is again strongly rejected. The test statistics shown in Parts A and B of
Table 6 reinforce the inferences obtainedfrom the fixed-effects ANOVAs: L-nonbound banks also were
E-nonbound at the time ofthe 1990-91 reduction, and larger L-bound institutionsresponded more
strongly to the reductions than smaller banks.
Ourfinal repeated measures test is graphical, shown in Figures 9 and 10. The test is based on the
differences ~ = y~9, — yq9o and =y~92
— y~,91, respectively, wherey~is the ratio ofbase
money(vault cash + FederalReserve deposits) to net transaction deposits held by depository institution i
in reserve maintenance periodj, j=I,...13, during year4 t=90, 91, 92. Letting denote the mean of
the formaintenanceperiodj, then under suitable regularity conditions a (ioo — y) percent
confidence interval forthe null hypothesis that =0 is
( f>~ (~D.)2 j~ ()2 ~
— ~ /2 (I) , + ~ (1) Jwhere ~ //2 is the [(1+‘y)/ 2]th quantile of the t
distribution with n-I degrees of freedom. 52 These confidence intervals are plotted as horizontal line
segments in Figures 9 and 10. The length ofeach line segment shows the width of the confidence
interval, the numbers on the vertical axis index the reserve maintenance periodj, andthe means D.J are
Si See Crowderand Hand (1990), Diggle, Liang and Zeger (1994), or Davidian and Giltinan (1995). An earlier
reference is Hsiao (1986).AndersonandRasche, “Defining the Adjusted Monetary Base...” Working Paper 96-014 52
indicated by the largedots on each line. We show the confidence intervals graphically, rather than
reporting significance levels (p-values) forrejection/acceptance of the null hypothesis of no response to a
change in the reserve requirement ratio, because inferences drawn from agraphical presentation likely
are more robust to deviations of oursample data from the regularityconditions thatjustify useofthe
(asymptotic) t-distribution in construction ofthe intervals. A graphical presentation also is somewhat
easier to interpret thanclassical test statistics whenbetween bank, within-group variances are small, as
reflected in the short length ofthe confidence intervals.
The responses ofbanks to the 1990-91 reduction in the reserve requirement ratios on nonpersonal
time and savings and on Eurodollar borrowings to zerofrom 3 percent are shown in Figure9. The results
are clear: L-bound banks, shown in the second row ofthe figure, reducedtheir holdings of base money
relativeto net transaction deposits by about -0.02, close to the estimates obtained in the ANOVA models,
while L-nonbound institutions did not respond. Of special interest is the confidence interval forthe
change between the 13th maintenance period in 1990 and in 1991. The reduction was phased-in, with
only one-halfof the reduction in force during the final reserve maintenance period of 1990. E-bound
banks would be expected to respondto the phased reduction by displayingasmallerresponse forthis
13th period thanforthe other 12 periods. Such aresponse isdistinct forL-boundbanks and absent forL-
nonbound banks. We conclude that: (1)L-nonbound depository institutions likely were E-nonbound
before the 1990-91 reduction, andhence should be excluded from RAM; and (2) L-boundinstitutions
generally were E-bound, and responded as expected to the reduction in requirements.
Acorresponding test forthe effect ofthe April 1992 reduction in the marginal reserve
requirement ratio on transaction deposits to 10 from 12 percent is shown in Figure 10. Small and
medium-size L-nonbound and L-bound banks did not respond to the change: their confidence intervals
either include, or are very close to, the origin. LargerL-bound banks reduced their holdings of base
money. On average, the response of these banks was less than the 0.02 reduction in the statutory
52 See for example Mood, Graybill and Boes (1974), p.387.Anderson andRasche, “Defining the Adjusted Monetary Base...” WorkingPaper 96-014 53
requirement,perhaps reflecting the effect ofafalling federal funds rate. The less-than-proportionate
response also may signal that the banks were becoming, or had become, E-nonbound. In fact, by the end
of 1992 about halfof these banks had requiredclearing balance contracts voluntarily obligating
themselves to maintain Federal Reserve deposits in excess ofamounts necessary to satisfy statutory
reserve requirements. We conclude that by the end of 1992 only a small numberof U.S. depository
institutions found statutory reserve requirementsto be the primaryfactor governing their demand forbase
money.
5. Conclusions
The evidence presented in this article suggests that the trend toward lower reserve requirements
since the Monetary Control Acthas significantly reduced the role of legal reserve requirements as a
determinant ofdepository institutions’ demandforbase money. As a result, additional care must be
exercised whencombining the effects of changes in reserve requirements with changes in the monetary
base ifthe adjusted monetary base is to remain interpretable as an index ofquantitative monetary policy
actions. In particular, the RAM adjustment included in the St. Louis adjusted monetary base should be
modified to include only economically-bound depository institutions. Both the apparently incomplete
adjustment ofdepositories to the April 1992 reduction in reserve requirements and the continuing spread
of OCD-basedsweep programs suggestthat many, if not most, depository institutions mayeither be
economically nonbound or will become so in the nearfuture.
{Editor’s Note: In September 1996, the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis began publication of new
adjusted monetary base and adjusted reserves series incorporating the changes to the monetary (source)
base and the new RAM adjustment discussed in this paper.Anderson and Rasche, “Defining the Adjusted Monetary Base...” Working Paper 96-014 54
References
AdvisoryCommittee on Monetary Statistics (Bach Commission). improving the Monetary Aggregates
(WashingtonDC: Boardof Governors ofthe FederalReserve System, 1976)
Andersen,Leonall C. and Jerry L. Jordan. “The Monetary Base - Explanation and Analytical Use”.
Federal Reserve Bank of St.Louis Review, August 1968, pp. 7-11.
Anderson, Richard G. “Sweeps Distort Ml Growth”. Monetary Trends, Federal Reserve Bank ofSt.
Louis, November 1995
Anderson, Richard G. and Kenneth A. Kavajecz. “A Historical Perspective on the FederalReserve’s
Monetary Aggregates: Definition,Construction andTargeting”. Federal Reserve Bank ofSt. Louis
Review, March/April 1994, pp. 1-31.
_________________and RobertH. Rasche. “A Revised Measure ofthe St. Louis Adjusted Monetary
Base”. FederalReserve Bank ofSt. Louis Review, March/April 1996
___________________________________ “What Do Money Market Models Tell Us About How to
Implement Monetary Policy?”. Journal ofMoney, Credit and Banking (November 1982), pp. 796-828.
_________________ JamesJohannes and RobertH. Rasche. “A New Look at the Relationship Between
Time Series and Structural Models,” Journal ofEconometrics (October, 1983), pp. 234-51.
Benston, George. “An Analysis and Evaluation ofAlternative Reserve RequirementPlans,” Journal of
Finance, December 1969, 24(5), pp. 849-70.
Blinder, Alan S. and Robert M. Solow. “Analytical Foundations of Fiscal Policy.” In Alan Blinder and
others, eds., The EconomicsofPublic Finance (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1974).
Board of Governors ofthe Federal Reserve System. Federal Reserve System: Purposes and Functions,
3rded., 1954.
Brunner, Karl. “A Schemaforthe Supply Theory ofMoney,” international Economic Review (January
1961), pp. 79-109.
___________ and Allan H. Meltzer, “TheFederal Reserve’s Attachment to the Free Reserve Concept,”
paper presented to the House Subcommittee on Banking and Currency, 88th Congress, May 7, 1964.
Reprinted in Karl Brunner and Allan H. Meltzer,eds., Monetary Economics (Oxford: Basil Blackwell,
1989)
____________ and ______________ . “Liquidity Traps for Money, Bank Credit, and Interest Rates,”
JournalofPolitical Economy, Jan.-Feb. 1968, pp. 1-37. Reprinted in Karl Brunner and Allan H.
Meltzer,eds., Monetary Economics (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989)
___________ and _________________ , “TheNature of the Policy Problem,” in Brunner, ed., Targets and
Indicators ofMonetary Policy (San Francisco: Chandler, 1969)Anderson and Rasche, “Defining the Adjusted MonetaryBase WorkingPaper 96-014 55
Burger, Albert E. The Money Supply Process, BelmontCA: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1971.
Burger, Albert E. and RobertH. Rasche. “Revision of the Monetary Base,” Federal Reserve Bank of St.
Louis Review (July 1977), pp. 13-27.
Burgess, W. Randolph. The Reserve Banksand the Money Market. (Harper and Row, 1936)
Cagan, Phillip. Determinants and Effects ofChanges in the Money Stock, 1875-1960 (National Bureau of
Economic Research, 1965).
Charm, V.V., Lawrence J. ChristianoandMartinEichenbaum. “InsideMoney, Outside Money, and Short-
TermInterestRates”. JournalofMoney, Credit and Banking, November 1995, Part 2.
Crowder, M.J. and D.J. Hand. Analysis ofRepeated Measures (Chapman andHall, 1990)
Crowder, William J. and Dennis L. Hoffman. “The Long-Run Relationship between Nominal Interest
Rates and Inflation: The FisherEquation Revisited,” Journal ofMoney, CreditandBanking. Vol. 28, 1
(February 1996), pp. 102-18.
Davidian, Marie and DavidM. Giltinan. NonlinearModelsforRepeated Measurement Data (Chapman
andHall, 1995)
Dewald,William G. Monetary Control and the DistributionofMoney, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University ofMinnesota, l963a (abstract, JournalofFinance, XIX, 3, September 1964, p. 557).
________________ “Free Reserves, Total Reserves and Monetary Control”, Journal ofPolitical
Economy, April 1963 (1963b).
_________________ “A Review ofthe Conference on Targets andIndicators ofMonetary Policy,” in
Karl Brunner, ed., Targets and indicators ofMonetaryPolicy (San Francisco: Chandler, 1969), pp.
313-30.
Diggle, PeterJ., Kung-Yee Liang and Scott L. Zeger.Analysis ofLongitu4inal Data (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1994)
Feinman, Joshua. “Reserve Requirements: History, Current Practice and Potential Reform,” Federal
Reserve Bulletin (June 1993), pp. 569-89.
Friedman, Milton and AnnaJ. Schwartz. A Monetary History ofthe United States, 1867-1960 (Princeton
University Press, 1963).
Gambs, Carl M andRobert H. Rasche. “Costs of Reserves and the Relative SizeofMember and
Nonmember Bank Demand Deposits,” Journal of Monetary Economics (November 1978), pp. 715-723.
Gilbert, R. Alton. “Effectiveness of State Reserve Requirements,” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
Review (September 1978), pp. 16-28.
____________ “Revision of the St. Louis Federal Reserve’s Adjusted Monetary Base,” Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review (December 1980), pp. 3-10.Anderson and Rasche, “Defining theAdjusted Monetary Base...” Working Paper 96-014 56
______________ “A Revision in the Monetary Base,” Federal Reserve Bank of St.Louis Review
(AugustlSeptember 1987), pp. 24-29.
______________ andJean M. Lovati. “Bank Reserve Requirements and TheirEnforcement: A
ComparisonAcross States.” FederalReserve Bank ofSt. Louis Review (March 1978), pp. 22-31.
Gurley, John G. and Edward S. Shaw. Money in a Theory ofFinance. Washington,DC: The Brookings
Institution, 1960.
Hilton, Spence, An Cohen and Ellen Koonmen. “Expanding ClearingBalances,” in ReducedReserve
Requirements: Alternativesfor the Conduct ofMonetary Policy andReserveManagement, Ann-Marie
Muelendyke, ed., FederalReserve Bank ofNewYork, 1993.
Hoffman, Dennis andRobert H. Rasche. “Long-Run Incomeand InterestElasticities ofthe Demand for
Ml andthe Monetary Base in the Postwar U.S. Economy.” Review ofEconomics and Statistics ,vol. 73
(1991), pp. 665-74.
______________ and ___________ . Aggregate Money Demand Functions: Applications of
CointegrationAnalysis. Boston, MA: KluwerAcademic Publishers, 1996.
______________ _______________and M.A. Tieslau. “The Stability of Long-Run Money Demand in
Five Industrialized Countries.” Journal ofMonetary Economics, 1995.
Hsiao, Cheng. Analysis of Panel Data. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986.
Kohn, Donald L. “Comments on Anderson andRasche, ‘Redefining the Adjusted Monetary Base’ “,
Federal Reserve Bank ofSt. Louis Review, November/December 1996, forthcoming.
Meigs, James. Free Reserves and the Money Supply Process (Chicago: University ofChicago Press,
1962)
Mood, Alexander M., Franklin A. Graybill and Duane C. Boes. introduction to the Theory ofStatistics
New York: Mc Graw Hill, 1974.
Richards, Heidi Willman. “Daylight OverdraftFees and the Federal Reserve’s Payment System Risk
Policy,” FederalReserveBulletin (December 1995), pp. 1065-77.
Robert H. Rasche andJamesM. Johannes. Controlling the GrowthofMonetary Aggregates . Boston:
KluwerAcademic Publishers, 1985.
Stevens, E.J. “Required Clearing Balances”, FederalReserve Bank ofCleveland Economic Review, vol.
29., no. 4 (1993), pp. 2-14
Tatom, John A. “Issues in Measuring An Adjusted Monetary Base,” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
Review (December 1980), pp.1 1-29.
Taylor, John B. “Discretion versus Policy Rules in Practice”, Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on
Public Policy, vol. 39 (1993), pp. 195-214.Anderson and Rasche, “Defining theAdjusted MonetaryBase...” WorkingPaper96-014 57
Teigen, Ronald L. “Demand andSupply Functions forMoney in the U.S.: Some Structural Estimates,”
Econometrica, 32 (1964), pp. 476-509.
Tobin, James. “Money,Capital andOther Stores ofValue.” American EconomicReview, (May 1961),
pp. 26-37.
Tolley, George S. “Providing forthe Growth of the Money Supply.” JournalofPoliticalEconomy,
December 1957, pp. 465-85.
Wijnholds, J. Onno de Beaufort, Sylvester C.W. Wijffinger and Lex H. Hoogduin. A Frameworkfor
Monetary Stability (Amsterdam: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1993.Table 1
Current and Revised Measures of the M~netary Base, December 1995
Factors Supplying High-Powered Money Factors Using High-Powered Money: Old Measure of the Monetary Base
(1) Reserve Bank credit
(a) Securities held by the Federal Reserve 387.132
(b) Loans to depository institutions 0.209
(c) Federal Reserve float 1.223
(d) Other Federal Reserve assets 32.212
Total Reserve Bank credit
(2) Gold stock
(3) SDR certificates
(4) US Treasury currency and coin outstanding
Total supply of high-powered money
other than Reserve Bank credit
(5) Total supply of high-powered money 465.952
(6) The Monetary Base: Current Measure
(a) Currency and coin in circulation
(b) Resprve balances of depository institutions
at Federal Reserve Banks ______
Total use as the monetary base
420.776 (7) Uses of high-powered money other than as the monetary base
(a) Treasury cash holdings 0.271
(b) Deposits of other than domestic financial
institutions at Federal Reserve Banks 7.349
(c) Other Federal Reserve liabilities and capital 12.841
(d) Deposits, other than reserve balances, of
domestic financial institutions at Federal Reserve
45.177 Banks, including contractual amount of required
clearing balances 5.002
Total other factors using high-powered money 25.462
Factors Using High-Powered Money: Revised Measure
of the Monetary Base
billions of dollars, not seasonally adjusted
Components may not add to totals due to rounding.
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
(8) The Monetary Base: Revised Measure
(a) Currency and coin in circulation
(b) Deposits of financial institutions at Federal
Reserve Banks (revised measure)
Total use as the monetary base
(9) Uses of high-powered money other than as the
(a) Treasury cash
(b) Deposits of other than domestic financial
institutions at Federal Reserve Banks














Total other factors using base money (revised measure) 20.460Andcrwn and Rasche, Redefining the Adjusted Monetary Base.,.”
Table 2
Statistics on Legally and Economically Bound and Nonbound Depository Institutions, Selected Years
A. Statistics on Weekly-Reporting Depository Institutions (Federal Reserve FR2900 report)
1983 1985 I 1987 1989 I j 1991 1993 I 1995
Distribution of Number of Weekly-Reporting Depository Institutions, by reserve status (percent of weekly-reporting institutions)
L-Bound 33.7 45.4 47,5 27.4 34.4 30.2
L.Nonbound 66.3 54,6 52.5 72.6 65,6 69.8
E-Bound 33.7 45.4 47.5 5.9 6.0 5.5
E-Nonbound 66.3 54,6 52.5 94.1 94.0 94.5
Distribution of Total Deposits at Weekly-Reporting Depository Institutions, by reserve status (percent of total deposits of weekly reporters)
L-Bound 60,4 70.3 79.3 81.6 72.9 78.2 75.1
L-Nonbound 39.6 29.7 20.7 18,4 27,1 21,8 24.9
E-Bound 60.4 70.3 79,3 81.6 54.8 57.7 56.3
E-Nonbound 39.6 29.7 20.7 18.4 45.2 42.3 43.7
Distribution of Net Transactions Deposits at Weekly-Reporting Institutions, by reserve status (percent of aggregate net transactions deposits of weekly reporters)
L~Bound 74.6 78,9 85.1 86.1 80.0 85.3 82,1
L-Nonbound 25,4 21,1 14.9 13.9 20.0 14.7 17.9
E-Bound 74.6 78.9 85.1 86.1 64.5 67.7 66,6
E-Nonbound 25.4 21.1 14.9 13.9 35.5 32.3 33.4
Distributions of Required Reserves of Weekly-Reporting Depository Institutions, by reserve status (percent of aggregate required reserves of weekly reporters)
L-Bound 92.0 93.0 94.9 95.2 93.1 94,8 91,8
L-Nonbound 8.0 7.0 5.1 4.8 6,9 5,2 8.2
E~Bound 92.0 93,0 94.9 95,2 82.8 83.1 81.2
E-Nonbound 8.0 7.0 5.1 4.8 17.2 16.9 18.8Anderson and Rasche, “Redefining the Adjusted Monetary Base...”
Table 2 (con’t)
8. Statistics on the sum of Weekly, Quarterly and Annual Reporting Depository Institutions
1983 1985 I 1987 1989 1991 1993 II 1995
Distribution of Number of Reporting Depository Institutions, by reserve category (percentage of reporting institutions)
L~Bound 19.1 19.8 22.1 19.8 11,1 14.4 11.7
L-Nonbound 80.9 80.2 77.9 80.2 88.9 85.6 88.3
E-Bound 19.1 19.8 22.1 19.8 2.4 2.5 2.1
E-Nonbound 80.9 80.2 77.9 80.2 97.6 97.5 97.9
Distribution of Total Deposits, by reserve category (percentage of reported total deposits)
L-Bound 56.9 66.8 73.9 75.5 67,1 72.1 69.1
L-Nonbound 43.1 33.2 26.1 24.5 32.9 27.9 30.9
E-Bound 56.9 66.8 73.9 75.5 50.4 53.2 51.8
ENonbound 43.1 33.2 26.1 24.5 49,6 46,8 48.2
Notation: L-Bound denotes legally-bound, L-Nonbound denotes legally nonbound (applied vault cash exceedsrequired reserves), E-Bound denotes
economically-bound (as defined in this article), E-Nonbound denotes economically-nonbound. All quarterly and annual reporting institutions
are considered as both legally and economically nonbound in the construction of this table.
Source: tabulations by the authors from unpublished Federal Reserve data.Anderson andRasehe, “Redefining...”
Table 3
SummaryStatistics for Depository Institutions Used in ANOVA
(by reserve status and size, billions of dollars exceptnumberof institutions)
A. Banks Classified on Legal ReserveStatus in 1992, and on Size ~n 19901
Required Required Required Applied Aggregate Amount of Numberof
Reserves Reserves Clearing Vault Net Base Money Banks
Total Against Net Balances Cash Transaction Held
Transaction (contracted Deposits (Vault Cash





Small 1.16 0.62 0.11 0.68 24.3 1.37 1139
Medium 2.67 2.04 0.14 1.37 33.0 2.89 512
Regional 3.41 2.81 0.12 1.37 27.4 3.57 122
Large 8.68 7.12 0.10 3.64 61.1 8.86 49
1991
Small 0.72 0.72 0.17 0.61 26.9 1.09 1139
Medium 2.34 2.34 0.20 1.38 35.7 2.64 512
Regional 3.07 3.07 0.16 1.40 29.6 3.28 122
Large 7.41 7.41 0.36 3.57 63.6 7.83 49
1992
Small 0.94 0.94 0.21 0.70 31.8 1.30 1139
Medium 2.56 2.56 0.26 1.47 41.3 2.89 512
Regional 3,06 3.06 0.35 1.43 34.4 3.46 122
Large 7.08 7.08 0.89 3.55 72.4 8.01 49
L-Nonbound Banks
1990
Small 1.45 0.85 0.21 1.33 35.78 2.33 2209
Medium 0.14 0.10 0.02 0.13 2.27 0.19 45
1991
Small 0.93 0.93 0.25 0.93 38.37 2.33 2209
Medium C. 11 0.11 0.02 0.10 2.29 0.18 45
1992
Small 1.08 1.08 0.30 1.08 43.35 2.48 2209
Medium 0.11 0.11 0.02 0.11 2.46 0.20 45
‘Banks are classified based on their legal reserve status in 1992 H2and on their size in 1990 H2. Banks are
classified as L-Bound if they were legally bound in one ormore reserve maintenance periods during 1992 H2; if not,
they are classified as L-Nonbound. Banksare classified as small iftheir net transactions deposits did not exceed the
low reserve tranche ($40.4 million) in any reserve maintenance period during 1990 H2, and are classified as medium
or regional if their average level ofnet transactions deposits during 1990 H2 did not exceed $125 million or $500
million, respectively. Banks with net transactions deposits averaging more than $500 million during 1990 H2 are
classified as large.Anderson and Rasche, “Redefining...”
Table 3 (continued)
B. Banks Classified on Legal Reserve Status in 1990, 1991 and 1992, and on Size in 19902
Required Required Required Applied Aggregate Amount of Numberof


















Small 0.33 0.14 0.02 0.09 5.5 0.36 236
Medium 1.95 1.52 0.09 0.82 22.5 2.06 316
Regional 3.15 2.61 0.12 1.17 25.3 3.30 114
Large 8.10 6.61 0.09 3.28 56.7 8.26 44
1991
Small 0,18 0.18 0.03 0.09 6.2 0.25 236
Medium 1.73 1.73 0.11 0.85 24,4 1.87 316
Regional 2.86 2.86 0.15 1.22 27.5 3.04 114
Large 6.87 6.87 0.34 3.24 58.9 7.27 44
1992
Small 0.24 0.24 0.04 0.10 7.5 0.32 236
Medium 1.86 1.86 0.15 0.89 28.3 2.05 316
Regional 2.84 2.84 0.34 1.25 31.9 321 114
Large 6.64 6.64 0.86 3.21 67.9 7.53 44
L-Nonbound Banks
1990
Small 2.28 1.32 0.30 1.92 54.6 3.34 3112
Medium 0.86 0.63 0.75 0.67 12.8 1.01 241
1991
Small 1,47 1.47 0.38 1.44 59.0 3.18 3112
Medium 0.72 0.72 0.11 0.63 13.6 0.96 241
1992
Small 1.77 1.77 0.47 1.67 67.7 3.46 3112
Medium 0.81 0.81 0.13 0.69 15.4 1.04 241
~Banks are classified as L-Bound if theywere legally bound in all reserve maintenance periods in 1990 H2, 1991 H2
and 1992 H2; if not, theyare classified as L-Nonbound. Banks areclassified as small if their nettransactions
deposits did not exceed the low reserve tranche ($40.4 million) in any reserve maintenance period during 1990 H2,
and are classified as medium or regional iftheir average level of net transactions deposits during 1990 H2 did not
exceed $125 million or $500 million, respectively. Banks with net transactions deposits averaging more than $500
million during 1990 H2 are classified as large.Anderson and Rasche, “Redefining the Adjusted Monetary Base
Table 4
ANOVA Model Estimates for Weekly-Reporting Banks
A. Banks Classified on Legal Reserve Status in 1992 and on Size in 19901
Category _____________________
________________ L-Bound Banks ______________ L-Nonbound Banks
Statistic Small Medium Regional Large Small Medium
F Statistics
(numerator degrees of freedom)
for bank fixed effects 25.9 (1138) 101.3 (511) 72.4 (121) 69.0 (48) 4119.7 (2208) 144.7(44)
p~value (Pr> F) 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
for year fixed effect 430.2 (2) 3917.2 (2) 346.4 (2) 1152,5(2) 2781.9 (2) 10.4 (2)
p-value (Pr> F) 0.000 1 0.0001 0.000 1 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
Coefficient Estimates (f-statistic)
Year effects
1990 versus 1992 0.021 (25.9) 0.017 (84.9) 0.032 (26.5) 0.036 (47.9) 0.009 (75.1) 0.003 (4.0)
p-value (Pr> It I) 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
1991 versus 1992 0.001 (0.8) 0,003 (17.5) 0.013 (10.5) 0.013 (17.4) 0.003 (30.7) 0.0(0.0)
p-value (Pr> It I) 0.4582 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.9978
Required Clearing Balance 0.004 (2.0) 0.006 (9.4) 0.022 (6.8) 0.015 (11.3) 0.009 (26.9) 0.001 (0.4)
p-value (Pr> It I) 0.0465 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.6756
Summary Statistics
Model degrees of freedom 1153 526 136 63 2223 59
Error degrees of freedom 43267 19441 4621 1847 83927 1695
R-Squared 0.41 0.75 0,67 0.75 0.76 0.79
Banks are classified as L-Bound if they were legally bound in one or more reserve maintenance periods during 1992 H2; if not, they areclassified asL-
Nonbound. Banks are classified as small if their net transactions deposits did not exceed the low reserve tranche ($40.4 million) in any reserve maintenance
period during 1990 H2, and are classified as medium or regional if their average level of net transactions deposits during 1990 H2did not exceed $125 million or
S50() million, respectively, Banks with net transactions deposits averaging more than $500 million during 1990 H2 are classified as large.Anderson and Rasche, Redefining the Adjusted Monetary Base
Table 4 (continued)
B. Banks Classified on Legal Reserve Status in 1990, 1991 and 1992, and on Size in 19902
L-Bound Banks L-Nonbound Banks
Small Medium Regibnal Large Small Medium
Banks are classified as L-Bouncl if they were legally bound in all 39 reserve maintenance periods in 1990 1-12, 1991 H2 and 1992 H2; if not, they are classified
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0.79Anderson and Rasche, Redefining the Adjusted Monetary Base
Table 5
ANOVA Model E~ timates for Weekly-Reporting Banks, with Bank*Year Interaction Effects
A. Banks Classified on Legal Reserve Status in 1992 and on Size in 19901
L-Bourtd Banks L-Nonbound Banks
Small Medium Regional Large Small Medium
l3anks are classified as L-Bound if they were legally bound in one or more reserve maintenance periods during 1992 H2; if not, they are classified asL-
Nonbound. Banks areclassified as small if uleir net transactions deposits did not exceed the low reserve tranche ($40.4 million) in any reserve maintenance
period during 1990 H2, and are classified as medium orregional if their average level of net transactions deposits during 1990 H2 did not exceed $125 million or
~5OO million, respectively. Banks with net transactions deposits averaging more than $500 million during 1990 H2 are classified as large.
Statistic
F Statistics
(numerator degrees of freedom)
for bank fixed effects
p-value (Pr> F)
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Table 5 (continued)
B. Banks Classified on Leaal Reserve Status in 1990. 1991 and 1992. and on Size in 19902
L-Bound Banks L-Nonbound Banks
Small Medium Regional Large Small Medium
Banks are classified as L-Bound if they were legally bound in all 39 reserve maintenance periods in 1990 H2, 1991 H2 and 1992 H2; if not, they are classified
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Test Statistics for Repeated Measures ANOVA Models
Null Hypothesis: NoYear-Period interaction Effect for 1990, 1991 and 1992
A. Banks Classified on Legal Reserve Status in 1992 and on Size in 19901
L-Bound Banks L-Nonbound
Banks
Small Medium Regional Large Small Medium
B. Banks Classified on Legal Reserve Status in 1990, 1991 and 1992, and on Size in iggd2
Small Medium Regional Large Small Medium
Banks areclassified as L-Bound if they were legally bound in oneor more reserve maintenance periodsduring
1992 H2; if not, they areclassified as L-Nonbound. Banks areclassified as small if their nettransactions deposits
did notexceed the low reserve tranche ($40.4 million) in any reserve maintenance period during 1990 112, and are
classified as medium orregional if theiraverage level ofnet transactions deposits during 1990H2 did not exceed
$125 million or $500 million, respectively. Banks with net transactions deposits averaging more than $500 million
during 1990 H2 areclassified as large.
2 Banks areclassified as L-Bound if they were legally bound in all 39 reserve maintenance periods in 1990 HZ, 1991
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C ~ iii ~ ~Figure 8Confidence Intervals
For the Difference between 1990 and 1991’s
Monetary Base to Net Transaction Ratio
Selection Criteria: All Bound in 1992
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APPENDIX 1
MEASURING THE NEW ADJUSTED MONETARY BASE AND RESERVES
The St.Louis adjusted monetary base, adjusted total reserves and adjusted nonborrowedreserves equal,
respectively, the sum of the monetary source base, total reserves, andnonborrowed reserves plus an
appropriate RAM adjustment. The new adjusted monetary base and reserves time series are chain
indexes, created in segments. The beginning and endofsegments are demarcated by major changes in the
structure of reserve requirements. Between these dates, the reserve adjustment magnitude, or RAM,
“adjusts”the monetary base forchanges in the demandforbase money dueto changes in statutory
reserve requirement ratios within agiven structure ofreserve requirements (where the structure defines
thetypes of deposits that are reservable, perhaps by class or typeofdepository institution), conditional
on an assumedmodel of depository institutions’ demandforbase money; see Burgerand Rasche (1977)
and Anderson and Rasche (I996a). When there is amajor change in the structure ofreserve
requirements — such as the extension of reserve requirements to nonmember banks andthrifts under the
Monetary Control Act — the old RAM ends andanew RAM begins. During periods both before and after
the break, for example, the AMB equals the sum of the monetary source base and a RAM — but not the
same RAM before andafter the break.
The AdjustedMonetary Baseasa Chain Index
The new AMB index is constructed in four segments: January 1936 - December 1972, December
1972 - January 1975, January 1975 - October 1980, andOctober 1980 to date. The overall AMB for
1936 - date is created by splicing the individual segments at the overlapping months: December 1972,
January 1975, and October 1980. The methodology is described in Tatom (1980).
The major cause ofthe discontinuity at each break is that the adjacent RAM adjustments
necessarily have different base periods. The new adjusted monetary base presented in thisarticle is built
from four RAMs: RAM11976_72, RAM21972 ~ RAM3,97580, and RAM419809~. Each RAM has aAnderson and Rasche, “Definingthe Adjusted Monetary Base...” Working Paper 96-014 Appendix I - Page A1-2
differentbase period,correspondingto aparticular structure ofreserve requirements. The statutory
reserve requirements that correspond to the firstthreeare discussed in Tatom (1980). The base period
forthe fourth is the set of reserve requirements in effect during the reserve maintenance period ending
January 7, 1991; see Anderson and Rasche (1996a). Adjacent pairs of RAM are measurable ateach
splice date -- December 1972, January 1975, and October 1980— permitting chainingthe overall AMB
index.
For the most recent subinterval, from November 1980 - date, the AMB equals the sum ofthe
monetary base and RAM41980.96. For the period January 1975 - October 1980, the AMB equals the sum
of the monetary base and RAM31975_80, multiplied by the ratio of the adjusted monetary base in October
1980 (including the RAM appropriate to 1980-96) to the adjusted monetary base in October 1980
(including the RAM appropriate to 1975-80). For example, the AMB forSeptember 1980 is







For earlier periods, the AMB is multiplied by more than one ratio. The AMB forJuly 1974, forexample,
equals: MonetaryBase~01~
1974 + RAM2197275
July 1974 multiplied by
(Monetary Base33~~~1975
+ RAM3197580
Ja~u~ 1975 x (Monetary BaseOctober1980 + R ~M41980.96
October 1980
(~ry Basejanua~i97s+ RAIVI21 972-75 January 1975 ) ~Monetary BaseOctober1980 + RAM3197~80October 1980
The first ratio chains the 1972-75 data to the 1975-80 data, andthe second chains the 1975-80 data to the
1980-96 data.
Growth rates ofthe current (old) and revised (new) AMB since 1980 are shown in FigureA-I.
Differences between the old and new AMB are evident during the 1981-84 segmentofthe phase-in of
new reserve requirements under the Monetary Control Act, and during the 1990 recession and later
recovery.Anderson andRasche, “Defining theAdjusted Monetary Base...” WorkingPaper96-014 Appendix 1 PageAl-3
The RAMAdjustment
RAM11936_72, RAM2 4972-75’ and RAM31975_80 are dueto Tatom (1980); see hisAppendix 1,
Table 1. We use only the RAM adjustment, not the published adjusted monetary base or adjusted
reserves data shown inTatom (1980); adifferent monetary source base, discussed in the nextsection, is
used to construct the new adjusted monetary base. Tatom’s three RAM adjustments are based,
respectively, on the structures of reserve requirements in effect during 1935, 1972 and 1975.
The new RAM4 presented in this article for dates beginning October 1980 is calculated by the
method described in Anderson and Rasche (1996a). The new RAM is computed from depositand
reserves data submitted weekly since 1980 to the Federal Reserve by about 12,000 depository
institutions. For each week (through January 1984), or biweekly reserve maintenance period (beginning
February 1984), the calculation proceeds in threesteps:
1) First, depository institutions are separated into two groups, based on the statistical research discussed
in thisarticle. The firstgroup includes all economically-bound (E-Bound) institutions, or in other
words, all institutionssubject to FederalReserve reserve requirements whose (i) net transactions
deposits exceed the low reserve tranche, and (ii) required reserves exceed the amount of vault cash
that they may use to satisfy required reserves. Other depositories are placed in the second group, In
addition, forreserve maintenance periods beginning January 8, 1991, depository institutionswith net
transactions deposits less than about $135 million are moved from the first group to the second (this
cutoffis indexed to the annual growth in aggregate net transactions deposits).
2) Next, for each institution in the first group, an individual-institution RAM is calculated by
subtracting the institution’s required reserves in that week (orreserve maintenance period) from an
estimate of what the institution’s required reserves would have beenif the reserve requirements that
prevailed during the reserve maintenance period ending January 7, 1991 had been in effect. This isAndersonand Rasche, “Definingthe Adjusted Monetary Base. ..“ Working Paper96-014 Appendix I Page Al-4
the Burger-Rasche (1977) adjustment applied to individual institutions, usingthe January 1991 base
period.
3) Finally, the aggregate reserve adjustment magnitude is calculated foreach week (or reserve
maintenance period) by summing the individual reserve adjustment magnitudes across all depository
institutions in the first group. Nothing is included in RAM for depositories in the second group.
The old (published by the Federal Reserve Bank ofSt. Louis through October 1996) and new RAM
adjustments are shown in Figure A-2, beginning in 1981. Note that both series have been normalized to
zero in December 1980; in fact, the new RAM adjustment is about $10 billion smaller than the old
adjustment. The difference in size between the two adjustments is dueto the choice of differentbase
periods, and is economically unimportant(thechoice of base period is unimportantfor most index
numbers). The adjustments differ during the 1980s becausethe new RAM more carefully separates L-
Bound andL-Nonbound institutions. Majordifferences arisefollowing the 1990-9 1 and 1992 changes in
statutory reserve requirements forthe same reason.
The above methods describe the construction ofRAM through December 1995 (and, after
benchmarkrevisions in future years, through December of the last completecalendar year). During the
current year, it is important to measure RAM by amethodthat is less data-intensiveandeasier to
implement on aweekly basis. For the current year, beginning January 1996, RAM for each reserve
maintenance period t is calculated as =[~ ~x NT~ ] x 0.02 where ~ ~ the estimated proportion
of aggregate net transactions deposits in E-Bound depository institutions at the end of 1995, equal to
0.65, and0.02 is the difference between the marginal reserve requirement on transactions deposits in
January 1991 (=0.12) and during 1996 (= 0.10). In early 1997, RAM will be recomputed for 1996 from
data on individual depository institutions and anew proportion ~ ~ calculated.Anderson andRasche, “Definingthe AdjustedMonetary Base...” WorkingPaper96-014 Appendix I Page Al-S
The Monetary (Source) Base
For January 1936 - December 1958, the new AMB includes the currently-published (on FRED)
St.Louis monetary source base. Beginning January 1959, the new AMB includes arevised St. Louis
monetary source base equal to the sum ofthreevariables: currency in circulation outside Federal
Reserve Banks andthe Treasury; deposits ofdomestic depository institutions atFederalReserve Banks;
andfloat-pricing related as-ofadjustments. This measureofthe monetary sourcebase corresponds to
line 8 of Table I in Anderson andRasche (1996a, 1996b). Data are obtained from the Divisionof
Monetary Affairs at the Federal Reserve Board of Governors; preliminary data are published each week
on the Board’s H.4.1 statistical release. The second item, Federal Reserve deposits,equals the sum of
two items published on the H.4.1: reserve balances andrequiredclearing balance contracts, the latter
shown in afootnote on the first pageofthe release. The third item, float-pricingrelated adjustments, is a
smallitem mandated by the Monetary Control Act’srequirement that the Federal Reserve recoverfrom
depository institutionsthe valueof float generated in check processing; it is includedin “service-related
adjustments” in afootnote on the firstpageofthe release. (Note that the aggregate amount ofreserve
balances shown on the H.4. 1 is defined by Board staffas equal to: the aggregate amount ofdepository
institutions’ Federal Reserve deposits, minus the aggregate amount ofrequired clearing balance contracts
andservice-related adjustments, minus other small unpublishedaccounting adjustments.)
Seasonal Adjustment
The new monthly AMB is seasonally adjusted with a sliding window Xl 1-ARIMA procedure.
First,an ARIMA model is used to forecastthe not seasonally adjusted AMB two years beyond the endof
last full yearofdata (atthe time ofthis writing, 1995), through December 1997. Then, beginning in
1950 (fluctuations in earlier data seem too unstable to reasonably estimate aseasonal component), the
standard Bureau ofthe CensusXli filteris applied sequentially toawindow of 8 years ofdata, the final
window spanning January 1990 through December 1997. This method permits more time variation in
the estimated seasonal factors than would be obtained by applying XII directly to longer spans of data.Anderson and Rasche, “Defining theAdjusted Monetary Base Working Paper 96-014 Appendix I PageAl-6
Such flexibility seems desirable forthe monetary base becauseatime-series plotof its monthly growth
rates suggests asharpdecrease in its seasonal amplitude after 1990, perhaps dueto heavy exports of
currency.
Seasonal adjustment factors forbiweekly (reserve maintenance period) data are obtained by a
ratio-of-moving-average procedure. In this method, a set of initial estimates of biweekly seasonally-
adjusted levels ofthe adjusted base is obtainedvia polynomial interpolation between observations on
seasonally-adjusted monthly levels. An initial setof seasonal adjustment factorsare obtainedby dividing
actual not-seasonally-adjusted biweekly levels by these initial estimated seasonally-adjusted levels. This
process is iterated to convergence, subject to the restriction that the final seasonally-adjusted biweekly
levels average to the given seasonally-adjusted monthly levels.
ADJUSTED TOTAL RESERVES
Issues in Defining “Total Reserves”ofDepository Institutions
There are two major, alternative economic measurementsof“total reserves.”
A. A Definition Motivated by Statutory Reserve Requirements
This narrow definition is “eligibleassets ofdepository institutions subject to Federal Reserve
reserve requirements.” “Eligible” here refers to assets that maybe used to satisfy statutory reserve
requirement~. against deposits,not be confused with the concept ofassets eligible to be used as collateral
for discount window loans. This definition focuses on satisfying statutory reserve requirements; a
depository’s business needs forvault cash and Federal Reserve deposits are not explicitly considered.
Rather, it is assumed that the amounts of vault cash andFederal Reserve deposits heldto satisfy statutory
requirements are sufficient to satisfy the depository’s paymentneeds.
Under this definition, “total reserves” includes:Anderson and Rasche, “Definingthe AdjustedMonetary Base Working Paper 96-014 Appendix I Page Al-7
1. fordates prior to November 1, 1959: Total Reserves = Federal Reserve deposits held by member
commercialbanks. Vaultcash was not an eligible asset priorto December 1959; required reserves
were satisfied with FederalReserve Bank deposits.
2. December 1, 1959 - November 11, 1980: Total Reserves = Federal Reserve deposits held by member
banks plus lagged vault cash of member banks. Only vaultcash held by abank two weeks prior to
the current week was eligible to satisfy reserve requirements. Because the required reserves of
virtually all member banks exceeded their (lagged) vault cash, essentially all lagged vault cash is
included in member bank reserves. The eligibility of vault cash to satisfy statutory required reserves
was phased-in from December 1, 1959 - November 23, 1960; beginning November 24, 1960, all
lagged vaultcash was an eligible asset. Vault cash held by nonmember banks and thrifts is not
included.
3. November 1980 - date: Total Reserves = current period vault cash ofdepository institutions in which
lagged vault cash exceedsrequired reserves,plus lagged vault cash for depository institutions in
which required reserves exceedsvault cash, plus the reserve balances ofall depository institutions.
Reserve balances is definedto equal aggregate Federal Reserve deposits minusaggregate required
clearing balance contracts. The amount of required clearing balance contracts is excluded because, it
is argued, depository institutions regard the FederalReserve deposits necessary to fulfill those
contracts as unavailable to support the issue ofadditional deposits or loans.
Published sourcesforthese data are shown in the following table.
Series Sources
Total Reserves, adjusted for changes in reserve
requirements and seasonally adjusted
1) Table 1 of the Board’s weekly H.3 release and
line 1, Table 1.20 ofthe Federal Reserve Bulletin.
2) Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis FRED
database, series “trarr”
Total Reserves, adjusted for changes in reserve
requirements, not seasonally adjusted
3) Table 3 ofthe Board’s weekly H,3 release and
line 6 in Table 1.20 ofthe Federal Reserve
Bulletin. (Not available on the FRED database.)Anderson andRasche, “Defining theAdjusted Monetary Base...” Working Paper 96-014 Appendix I PageAl- 8
Total Reserves, not adjusted forchanges in reserve
requirements, not seasonally adjusted
.
1) Table 2 of the Board’s weekly H.3 release and
line 11, Table 1.20 ofthe Federal Reserve
Bulletin.
2) Federal Reserve Bank ofSt. Louis FRED
database,series “totresns”
Nonborrowed reserves, adjusted for changes in reserve
requirements, seasonally adjusted
3) Table I ofthe Board’s weekly H.3 release and
line 2, Table 1.20 ofthe Federal Reserve Bulletin
4) Federal Reserve Bank ofSt. Louis FRED
database, series “bognonbr”
Excess reserves, not adjusted for changes in reserve
requirements, not seasonally adjusted
5) Table I of the Board’s weekly H.3 release and
line 16, Table 1.20 of the Federal Reserve
Bulletin
6) Federal Reserve Bank ofSt. Louis FRED
database, series “excresns”
Free reserves, adjusted forchanges in reserve
requirements, not seasonally adjusted
7) Calculated by this Bank from Board of
Governors’ data, equal to excessreserves minus
the sum ofadjustment plus seasonal discount
window borrowing; Federal Reserve Bank of St.
Louis FRED database,series “nsorbres”
Total discount window borrowing, not seasonally
adjusted -
-
1) Table 1 of the Board’s weekly H.3 release and
line 17, Table 1.20 of the Federal Reserve
Bulletin
2) FederalReserve Bank ofSt. Louis FRED
database, series “borrow”
Extended creditdiscount window borrowing, not
seasonally adjusted
3) Table 1 ofthe Board’s weekly H.3 release and
line 9, Table 1.11 of the FederalReserve Bulletin
4) Federal Reserve Bank ofSt. Louis FRED
database, series “extendns”
Adjustment plus seasonal discount window borrowing,
not seasonally adjusted
5) Equal to the sum of lines 7 and 8, Table 1.11,
Federal Reserve Bulletin.
6) Federal ReserveBank ofSt. Louis FRED
database, series “adjborns”
Data Sources: Federal Reserve Board, Aggregate Reserves ofDepository Institutions and theMonetary Base (H.3),
weekly statistical release, andTable 1.20 in the Federal Reserve Bulletin, monthly.
B. A Definition Motivatedby DepositoryInstitutions asFinancial Intermediaries andSellers of
Payments Services
One implication ofthe results reported in this article and in Anderson and Rasche (I996a) is that
broad measures of reserves may be important to modeling the role of depository institutions in the
economy. In addition to satisfying statutory reserve requirements, depository institutions must holdAnderson andRasche, ‘~DefiningtheAdjusted Monetary Base...” WorkingPaper 96-014 Appendix 1 Page Al-9
sufficient vault cash andFederalReserve deposits to convertretail customerdeposits into currency and
to make interbank payments, on request.
Although reserve requirements have varied significantly since the founding ofthe Federal
Reserve, it seems inappropriateto analyze the behavior of depository institutions solely from the narrow
viewpoint of assets eligible to satisfy statutory reserve requirements. Consider, forexample, the
exclusion ofvault cash at nonmemberdepository institutions from the narrow measure oftotal reserves
discussed in section A (above) fordates priorto the Monetary Control Act. The monetary aggregates
(Ml, M2 and M3) were extended in 1980 to include deposits at nonmember institutions, but the narrow
definition of total reserves excludes the vault cash held by these institutionsto service their deposits.
This argument may be extended to the inclusion of required clearing balance contracts in total reserves:
Federal Reserve deposits are held to service the customer deposits included in the monetary aggregates.
Adesire to maintain logical consistency amongmeasures of money and measures oftotal reserves
suggests that narrow measuresofreserves may be incomplete.
The measureoftotal reserves published by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis includes all the
base money held by domestic depository institutions, equal to the adjusted monetary base minus currency
held by the nonbank public, as explained in thisarticle and in Anderson and Rasche (1996a).
Adjusted TotalReserves
Similar to the AMB, and for the same dates, adjusted total reserves is constructed in four
segments. Within each segment, adjusted total reserves equals the adjusted total reserves component of
the AMB, The overall adjusted total reserves series is built by chainingtogether the four segmentsatthe
same dates and in the same manneras the AMB,
Despite common practice, adjusted total reserves for dates prior to November 1980 cannot be
obtained by subtracting the currency component of MI from the AMB. Rather, adjusted reserves mustAnderson and Rasehe, “Defining the Adjusted MonetaryBase WorkingPaper 96-014 Appendix I Page Al- 10
be calculated from unchained data on the adjusted reserves component ofthe AMB, andthenchained as
is the AMB.
Levels andgrowth rates of the current (old) and new (revised) adjusted total reserves series are
shown in Figures A-3 and A-4,respectively. The difference in level is dueprimarily toadifferentchoice
of the base period for RAM and is economically unimportant. The new adjusted total reserves series
grows more rapidly than the old series during the phase-in of the Monetary Control Actfrom 1981-86
and following the 1990-91 and 1992 reductions in reserve requirements. During the former, our RAM
adjustment based on individual institution data likely captures changes in the mix ofL-Bound andL-
Nonbound banks better than the old RAM based on aggregate reserve anddeposit data. In the latter, our
new measure of the monetary source base captures the significant increase in requiredclearing balance
contracts that is omitted from the old measure, Finally, our new measure ofreserves grows more slowly
after the February 1994 tightening of monetary policy thanthe old series and more rapidly than the old
series after mid-1995; this difference also is largely dueto the omission of the Federal Reserve deposits
used to satisfy required clearing balance contracts from the old measure of the monetary base.
Unadjusted TotalReserves
Fordates through December 1958,unadjusted total reserves (the reserves component ofthe
monetary source base) are unchanged from data previously published by this Bank. For dates beginning
January 1959, unadjusted total reserves is obtained by subtracting the currency component of Ml prom
the monetary source base described above. Measured in this way, total reserves includes all vault cash of
nonmember banks andthrifts prior to the Monetary Control Act.
The RAM Adjustment
The RAM adjustment is the same RAM used forthe adjusted monetary base.Anderson andRasche, “Defining the Adjusted Monetary Base...” Working Paper 96-014 Appendix I Page Al - ii
SeasonalAdjustment
Monthly and biweekly data are seasonally adjusted by the same methods used for the adjusted
monetary base.
Adjusted NonborrowedReserves
Similar to total reserves, adjusted nonborrowed reserves is constructed in four segments. Within
each segment, adjusted nonborrowed reserves equals nonborrowed reserves plus RAM. The overall
adjusted nonborrowed reserves series is built by chaining together the four segmentsatthe same dates
and in the same manner as the AMB. This procedure is necessary because acorrect time series for
adjustednonborrowed reserves cannot be obtainedby subtractingborrowings from chained adjusted
total reserve.
The RAM adjustment is the same RAM used forthe adjusted monetary base. Monthlyand
biweekly data are seasonally adjusted by the same methods used forthe adjusted monetary base.
FRED frequency
Series Title abbreviation of data included in FRB St.
Louis publication:
NewMonetary Base and Total Reserves, Available on FRED
DataSeries Described in this article
Revised St.Louis Adjusted Monetary Base, ambns_r monthly none
not seasonally adjusted
Revised St.Louis Adjusted Monetary Base, ambsl_r monthly Monetary Trends
seasonally adjusted
Revised St.Louis Adjusted Total Reserves, aresns_r monthly none
not seasonally adjusted
Revised St.Louis Adjusted Total Reserves, aressl_r monthly Monetary Trends
seasonally adjusted
Revised Monetary (source) Base, sbasens monthly none
not seasonally adjusted
Revised RAM, ram_r monthly none
not seasonally adjusted
Revised St. Louis Total Reserves, resns_r monthly none
not adjusted for changes in reserve
requirements, not seasonally adjustedAnderson andRasehe, “Defming theAdjusted Monetary Base...” WorkingPaper 96-014 Appendix i Page Al- 12
Revised St. Louis AdjustedMonetary Base,
seasonallyadjusted base_r bi-weekly U.S. Financial Data
Revised St.Louis Adjusted Total Reserves, adjres_r bi-weekly U.S. Financial Data
seasonallyadjusted
Data Series on FRED that will be discontinued atthe end of 1996
Adjusted St. Louis Monetary Base (old), not ambns monthly none
seasonally adjusted
Adjusted St. Louis Monetary Base (old), seasonally ambsl monthly Monetary Trends
adjusted
Adjusted St. Louis Total Reserves (old), not aresns monthly none
seasonally adjusted
Adjusted St. Louis Total Reserves (old), seasonally aressl monthly Monetary Trends
adjusted
Monetary (source) base (old), not seasonally sbasens monthly none
adjusted
RAM (old), not seasonally adjusted ram monthly none
Data Series on FRED that are discontinued as of October 10, 1996 (datawill not be updated or
extended)
Adjusted Fed Credit, nsa afcns monthly none
Adjusted Fed Credit, sa afcsl monthly none
Adjusted Fed Credit, sa afedcr weekly noneAnderson and Rasche, “Defining the Adjusted Monetary Base...” WorkingPaper 96-014 Appendix 2 PageA2-1
APPENDIX 2
FEDERAL RESERVE ACCOUNTING RULES APPLICABLE
TO REQUIRED CLEARING BALANCECONTRACTS
Why areRequired ClearingBalancesaReserve Management Tool?
In thisappendix, we summarize some of the accounting rules facing institutions with and
without contracted clearing balances.1 Our purpose is expository, focusing on the ways in which
the accounting practices encourage depositories to utilize required clearing balance contracts as a
form of reserve management.
The Federal Reserve deposits held to satisfy a required clearing balance contract area
bufferstock forthe depository. FederalReserve accounting rules first apply adepository’s
Federal Reserve deposits toward satisfying its statutory reserve requirements. (Ifthe depository
is L-Nonbound, or in other words satisfies its statutory requirements with vault cash, this amount
is zero.) Within the bounds of its required clearing balance contract, remaining Federal Reserve
deposits accumulate earnings credits that may be used to payfor FederalReserve priced services.
If after application of its FederalReserve deposits to satisfy required reserves the depository
institution has adeficiency relativeto the amount ofits required clearing balance contract, the
institution is penalized at a 2 or 4 percent annual rate, depending on the size ofthe deficiency.
The deficiency is not recorded as aloan or as an advance to the depository institution. This
aspect of the accounting rules — the ability to implicitly borrow reserve balances at a2o r4
Depository institutions include commercial banks, savings banks, savings and loan associations, and credit
unions. Many other institutions hold accounts atFederal ReserveBanks, including Edge Act and Agreement
corporations, bankers’ banks, branches and agencies offoreign banks, creditcard banks, nonbank banks,
limited purpose trustcompanies and industrial banks. We exclude all these latter institutions from our
analysis. Federal Home Loan Banks are permitted to open clearing and/or passthrough deposit accounts ata
Reserve Bank if they provide services for depository institutions in that District. In ouranalysis, we
attribute all such reserve deposits held by Federal Home Loan Banks back to their beneficial owners and
exclude the Home Loan Banks from further consideration.Anderson andRasche, “Defining the Adjusted Monetary Base...“ WorkingPaper 96-014 Appendix 2 Page A2-2
percent rate without incurring the discomfortofborrowing atthe discount window — endows the
required clearing balance contract with characteristics ofareserve management tool.
Required Reserves Against Deposits
ReserveBalance Accounts
Reserve balances are defined by Federal Reserve Board staffas equal to a depository’s
gross Federal Reserve deposits less the amount of its required clearing balance contract, ifany.
All member banks must maintain an individual reserve account at aFederalReserve Bank; other
depository institutions that are required to hold reserves against deposit or other liabilities may
eithermaintain their own reserve balance account or arrange a passthrough contract with an
approvedcorrespondent.2 Underapassthrough contract, the amount of reserve balancesthat a
Bound respondent institution must maintain to satisfy its reserverequirement (beyond its vault
cash) is chargedagainst its correspondent’s reserve account. Acorrespondent mayopen a
separate account to hold the reserve balances ofrespondents or may commingle respondent
balances in the correspondent’s reserve account.The correspondentdoes not submitto the
Federal Reserve data on the amount ofreserve balancesthat it holds forthe benefit ofeach
respondent bank. In our work, as explained above, we attribute all excess reserves in a
correspondent’s reserve account to the correspondent.
RequiredReserve Accounting Withouta Required Clearing Balance Contract
Most depository institutionscalculate their level of required reserves from their average
daily levels of its liabilities during a14-day reserve computation period that begins on Tuesday
and ends on the second following Monday. (Small institutionsthat report quarterly andannually
calculate required reserves from one week of data; the amount is held constant until the next
2 Only correspondents approved by the Board ofGovernors may be used. In addition to some depository
institutions, these include special purpose institutions such as the Federal Home Loan Banks and theAnderson andRasche, “Defining the Adjusted Monetary Base...“ WorkingPaper 96-014 Appendix 2 PageA2-3
reporting date.) Depositories satisfy the requirement during a 14-day reserve maintenance
period. The reserve maintenance period begins two days after the beginning ofthe current
reserve computation period (on Thursday, rather thanTuesday). For background, see Anderson
and Kavajecz (1994).
An institution may satisfy its reserve requirement in two parts. First, the average amount
ofvaultcash held during the reserve computation period that endedjust prior to the current
reserve computation period is applied toward its requirement.3 If required reserves are less than
this “applied vault cash”, the depository is legally nonbound (L-Nonbound) and is not required to
hold FederalReserve deposits to satisfy statutory reserve requirements. Ifthe level of the
depository’s required reserves exceedsthe amount of its applied vault cash, then the depository is
legally bound (L-Bound) and must satisfy the remainder of its requirement by holding Federal
Reserve deposits either in its own Federal Reserve account (without a passthrough contract) or in
acorrespondent’s reserve account (ifit has apassthrough contract).
Ifadepository is deficient (fails to satisfy) its required reserves overareserve
maintenance period, the depository is chargedapenalty atarate equal to the lowest discount rate
in effect on the first day ofthat calendar month plus 2 percentage points. It also maybe subject
to various administrativeactions andcounseling. Recall that becausethe institution’s Federal
Reserve deposits are applied first to satisfying its statutory required reserves, satisfaction ofits
required reserves is unaffected by whether the institution has signed a required clearing balance
contract.
National Credit Union Central Liquidity Facility that otherwise would not hold reserve balance accountsat
Federal Reserve Banks.
~This has differed through time. Prior to 1992, applied vault cash was based on vault cash held during the
reserve computation period two, notone, period priorto the current period.Anderson andRasche, “Defining theAdjusted MonetaryBase WorkingPaper 96-014 Appendix 2 PageA2.4
ClearingBalanceRequirements
Required Clearing Balance Accounts
Depository institutions may voluntary sign a requiredclearingbalancecontract witha
FederalReserve Bank. The accounting rules differ fordepository institutions with and without
passthrough reserve contracts.
Ifthe depository satisfies its statutory required reserves with a passthrough contract, the
FederalReserve deposits necessary to satisfy the contract will be maintained in aseparate
reserve clearing account. The smallestclearing balance contract usually permitted is $25,000.
Funds held in this account are treated separately foraccounting purposes from any funds held by
acorrespondent forthe benefit ofthe respondent depository. The clearing account providesthe
respondent access to FederalReserve priced services such as wire transfers and check processing
in addition to services purchased by the respondent from acorrespondent. (Some smaller
depositories apparently maintainaFederal Reserve deposit account as areserve clearing
accounts to assure some degree of independence from their correspondent.)
Ifthe institution does not have apassthrough contract, the FederalReserve deposits
necessary to satisfy the clearing balance contract are held in the same Federal Reserve account as
funds necessary to satisfy statutory reserve requirements. If the depository fully satisfies its
statutory reserve requirements with vault cash (or in other words is L-Nonbound), then the
depository need maintain no Federal Reserve deposits except those necessary to satisfy its
required clearing balance contract and/or to avoid overnight and over-the-limitdaylight
overdrafts.
A Federal Reserve Bank may impose aclearing balance requirement on an institution
with apoor account management record.Anderson and Rasche, “Defining theAdjusted Monetary Base...” WorkingPaper 96-014 Appendix 2 Page A2-5
Generally, depositories are discouraged from changing the amounts of requiredclearing
balance contracts more often thanonce amonth.
RequiredClearing Balance Accounting
For depositories withapassthrough contract, the average amount of funds in its clearing
account during areserve maintenance period is its maintainedclearingbalance. For abank
withoutapassthrough contract, the maintained balance equals the average amount in its reserve
account duringthe reserve maintenance period minus any part of the reserve balance applied to
satisfy required reserves.
Adepository withacontracted clearing balance requirement hasa clearing balance band
centered around the contracted clearing balance. The band equals the greater of± $25,000or± 2
percent ofthe contracted clearing balance. The band affects both the amount ofearnings credits
received and the depository’s ability to carryover excess reserve balancesto the next
maintenance period.
Depositories accumulate earnings credits on the maintained balance. Credits may only
be used to pay forFederal Reserve priced services.4 They may not be transferred, converted to
cash, or used to pay Federal Reserve penalties. Credits expire 52 weeks after being earned. The
credits are accumulated in the same manner as ifinterest were being earned on the maintained
balance.
The earnings creditrate varies with the institution’s marginal reserve requirement on
transactions deposits. Depositories that face marginal reserve requirements on transactions
deposits of zero, 3 and 10 percent accumulate credits at 90, 93 and 100 percent of the weekly
~These include charges for provision (but not delivery of) currency and coin, check clearing and collection.
electronic funds transfer, securities transactions, automated clearing house payments, Federal Reserve float,
and various electronic access fees for Federal Reserve services.Anderson and Rasche,“Definingthe AdjustedMonetary Base Working Paper 96-014 Appendix 2 Page A2.6
average federal funds rate, respectively.5 Ifthe maintainedbalance fallswithin the depository’s
clearing balance band, earnings credits are paid on the maintained balance. No credits are earned
on any portion of the maintainedbalance greater thanthe upper bound of the clearing balance
band, but the excess may be carried overto the nextreserve maintenance period up to a
maximum of 4 percent ofthe sum of the bank’s reserve and clearing balance requirements minus
the greater of $25,000or 2 percent ofits contracted clearing balance requirement.
If the maintained balance is less than the lower bound of the clearing balance band, the
institution is considered to be deficient. The depository maycarry forward into nextperiod all or
part ofthe deficiency, up toamaximum of 4 percent ofthe sum of its reserve and clearing
balance requirements minus the greater of$25,000or 2 percent of its contracted clearing balance
requirement. Any remaining deficiencybelow the lower bound ofthe clearing balance band but
greater than 80 percent of the contracted clearing balance requirement is assessed apenalty at a2
percent annual rate. The penalty increases to a4 percent annual rate on any shortfall below 80
percent of the contracted amount. A deficiency greater than the entire contracted clearing
balance requirement is adeficiency on required reserves for an L-Bound institution, and is
penalized atthe discount rate plus 2 percentage points. Any part ofadeficiency carried over to
the next maintenanceperiod but not offset by adequate surplus reserves during that period is
chargedpenalties as ifthey had not been carried over. Penalties must be paid in cash, not in
earnings credits.
~A bank may face a marginal reserverequirement ofzero either because it falls within thereserve
exemption amount (and hence is a very small bank) or because it satisfies its reserve requirement fully with
vault cash (is “nonbound” in Federal Reservejargon). A bank will face a marginal requirement of 3 percent
if it falls within the low reservetranche (has less than approximately $50 million in reservable deposits) and
does not hold enough vault cash to fully satisfy its reserve requirement. Thesepercentages arise because
clearing balances held by arespondent ata correspondent bank are classified as “due from banks” in the
Federal Reserve’s accountingsystem and are deductible from the total amountofdeposits against which
the respondent must maintain required reserves. Clearing balances at Federal Reserve Banks are not so
deductible, See Stevens (1993) for furtherdetails.Anderson andRasche, “Defining theAdjusted Monetary Base Working Paper 96-014 Appendix 2 Page A2-7
Carryover ofReserve Surpluses and Deficiencies, with and without contracted reserve
clearing balances
Depositories with passthrough reserve contracts are notpermitted to carry over reserve
deficiencies or surplusesto the next maintenance period, regardless of whether they maintain a
clearing account. Depositories without passthrough contracts that do not havecontracted
clearing balance requirements may carry over reserve surplusesand deficiencies up to 4 percent
of their required reserves. Depositories with contracted clearing balance requirements may carry
over surpluses and deficiencies in excess ofthe upper and lower bounds, respectively, oftheir
clearing balance band. The canyover is limited to 4 percent of the sum of their reserve and
clearing balance requirements minusthe greater ofeither $25,000 or 2 percent of the clearing
balance requirement.
Payments-Related Reserve Balance Requirements
As wenote in the manuscript above, published measures of the monetary base and
depository institution reserves include only end-of-day, close-of-business levels ofFederal
Reserve deposits. An important additional source of FederalReserve deposits used by
depositories forinterbank payments is daylight overdrafts on their Federal Reserve deposit
accounts. During 1995, daylight overdrafts related to wire transfer, check clearing and other
interbank p2vments activity averaged about $22 billion per day; see Richards (1995).
Banks mayincur daylight overdrafts atFederal Reserve Banks up toanet debit cap.
Well-capitalized banks may self-select theirdesired cap, as a percent ofrisk-based determined by
well capitalized banks, and is set by the Federal Reserve Bank for less well capitalized banks.
The Federal Reserve monitors the status ofeach bank’s reserve or clearing account at
one minute intervalsduring the day, and may reject Fedwire transferrequests for institutions
deemed to present special risks orfor transactions that exceed an institution’s net debit cap,Anderson and Rasche, “Defining the Adjusted Monetary Base...“ WorkingPaper 96-014 Appendix 2 PageA2-8
In April 1994, the Federal Reserve began chargingfordaylight overdrafts. The rate chargedis
currently 15 basis points, quoted on a24-hourday, and is applied to abank’s average overdrafts
(sampled every minute) incurred in their FederalReserve accounts during the 10 hours per day
that Fedwire operates.
Overnight overdrafts are generally not permitted, and maycause the bank to receive
special Federal Reserve counseling on management of its reserve account. Overnight overdrafts
are penalized at the greaterof (i) the effective federal funds rate on the date the overdraft
occurred plus 2 percentage points, or (ii) aten percent annual rate. The minimum charge is $100.
Charges may be increasedifthe numberofoverdrafts is judged excessive. Charges for
overdrafts of less than$10,000 will normally be waived unless the numberofoverdrafts has been
judged excessive by Reserve Bank staff.Anderson and Rasche, “Defining theAdjusted MonetaryBase.,.” Working Paper96-014 Appendix 3 Page A3-1
APPENDIX 3
RETAIL DEPOSIT SWEEP PROGRAMS AND THE MONETARY BASE
“Old” versus “New” Sweep Programs
During the last 30 years, the term “sweep program” has been used as a label for two
distinctlydifferent types of deposit and reserve management programs. Because recently
developed (since January 1994) retail sweep programs differ significantly from the sweep
programs developed during the 1960s, it is essential that they not be confused:
During the 1960s, some banks began moving funds late in the day, typicallyfor larger
business customers, from demanddeposits into overnight investments including money
market mutual funds, overnight Eurodollardeposits and overnight repurchase agreements.
These sweep programs were driven by two forces: banks were legally prohibited from
payingexplicit interest on demand deposits,and demanddeposits were subjectto relatively
high marginal statutory reserve requirements. Seeforexample Stigum (1990), chapter 6.
• SinceJanuary 1994, some depository institutions have reclassified, late in the day, some
retail transaction deposits (ATS/NOW and demand deposits) as money market deposit
accounts (MMDA). These sweep programs have been driven entirely by reserve avoidance:
MMDA accounts are classified for reserve requirement purposes as savingdeposits and
hence have a zero required reserve ratio.1 The zero reserverequirement applies only if no
The Garn-St. German Act created the MMDA deposit. Section 327 ofthe Act reads:
Section 204 of the Depository Institutions Deregulation Act of 1980(12 U.S.C. 3503) is amended by adding
at the end thereof the following:
“(c)(l)The Committeeshall issue a regulationauthorizing a new deposit account, effective not later than 60
daysafter the date ofenactmentofthis subsection, Such account shall be directly equivalentto and
competitive with money market mutual funds registered with the Securitiesand Exchange Commission under
the InvestmentCompany Actof 1940.
“(2)No limitation on the maximum rate or ratesofinterest payable on deposit accounts shall apply to the
account authorized by this subsection.
“(3)For purposesofsection 19(b) ofthe Federal Reserve Act, accounts established pursuant to this
subsection which are not ‘transactions accounts’ as defined by thereserve requirement regulationsofthe
BoardofGovernorsofthe Federal Reserve System as those regulationsexisted on August 1, 1982, shall not
be subjectto transaction account reserves, even though no minimum maturity it required,and even though up
to three preauthorized or automatic transfers and three transfers to third partiesare permitted monthly.”Anderson andRasche, “Defining the Adjusted Monetary Base...” WorkingPaper 96-014 Appendix 3 Page A3-2
more than sixtransfers per month are made from the MMDA to atransaction account; as a
result, the most common types ofsweep programs reclassify transactions deposits as MMDA
justbefore the close of business on Friday and reverse that reclassification atthe opening of
business on Monday. (Forreserve accounting, Friday’s closeofbusiness deposit level
counts as threedays — Friday, Saturday andSunday.)
The Motivationfor Recent Sweep Programs
Recent sweep programs likely have several motivations.
• By implementing asweep program, most L-Bound depository institutions are able to reduce
their required reserves — based solely on close-of-business levels of transactions deposits —
belowthe amount oftheir vaultcash and thereby become L-Nonbound. (Recall that reserve
requirements on liabilitiesother than transaction deposits were reducedto zero in December
1990.) As aresult, these institutionsno longer have to manage their Federal Reserve deposit
account so as to satisfy statutory reserve requirements over 14-day reserve maintenance
periods. Ifthe depository’s optimal amount of vault cash is unaffected by the sweep program
(which seems reasonable), then the economic effect is the same as if the FederalReserve and
the Congress had abolished statutory reserve requirements: the requirements no longer area
factor in the depository’s decision making and the reserve requirement tax on the institution
is zero.
• Although most L-Bound depositories sharply reduce their Federal Reserve deposits as they
become L-Nonbound following implementation of a sweep program, the size of the reduction
usually is less than the reduction in their required reserves. L-Nonbound institutions must
manage theirFederal Reserve deposits based on their payments activity, including wireAnderson and Rasche, “Defining theAdjusted Monetary Base...” Working Paper96-014 Appendix 3 PageA3-3
transfersand check clearing. If all receipts anddebits to the institution’s Federal Reserve
account were perfectly predictable, then the institution would have no incentive to hold a
nonzero balance overnight in aFederalReserve deposit. In fact, the timingofpayments is
uncertain, some are likely to occur late in the day, andovernight balancesare necessary to
avoid close-of-business (overnight) overdrafts. The institution might choose to offset the
cost ofholding overnight Federal Reserve deposits by signing a required clearing balance
contract. In this way, Federal Reserve deposits formerly used to satisfy statutory reserve
requirements can be used to defray the costofFederal Reserve priced services.
• Daylightoverdrafts provide an alternative to maintaining larger close-of-business deposit
balances. FederalReserve charges fordaylight credit are small.
Implications for Measuring the Adjusted Monetary Base andAdjusted Reserves
Effect on the Monetary Source Base
The spread of retail transaction deposit sweep programs since January 1994 reinforces
the importance of broadening the definition of the St. Louis monetary source base to include all
Federal Reserve deposits. The distortion to the previous measure is evident: a depository that
implements asweep program and subsequently re-labels its Federal Reserve deposit as held to
satisfy a requiredclearingbalance contract rather than to satisfy statutory required reserves
would cause the old measure of the monetary source base to decrease by the amount ofthe
required clearing balance contract even ~fthe institution did not, infact, reduce its Federal
Reserve deposits. (Note that the Board of Governors’ adjusted monetary base continues to
exclude the amount of required clearing balance contracts, and hence is affected by this
distortion.)
The amounts ofFederalReserve deposits included in the new St. Louis source base and
the amounts that would have been included ifwe continued our previous practice ofexcludingAnderson and Rasche, “Defining the Adjusted Monetary Base..,” Working Paper 96-014 Appendix 3 PageA3-4
required clearing balance contracts are shown in the upper two panels of Figure A-S (which is
the same as Figure 1 above). The difference is small until the December 1990 reserve
requirement reduction, anddecreases sharply following the January 1994 increase in the federal
funds rate target. The difference grows rapidly, even with the federal funds rate constant,
beginning mid-1995 as the spreadofsweep programs accelerates. Sweeps programjumped from
about $14 billion in May 1995 to about $150 billion in October 1996, while the difference
between the two FederalReserve deposit measures(essentially required clearing balance
contracts) increased by about $2 billion. These changes are consistent with Kohn’ s (1996)
estimate that about one-sixthofthe aggregate potential decrease in Federal Reserve deposits due
to sweep programs has been reflected in larger required clearing balance contracts.
Effect on RAM
The new RAM adjustment presented in thispaperincludes only E-Bound depository
institutions, definedas those depository institutions whose holdings ofbase money in each
reserve maintenance period, relativeto deposits, likely has been affected by the difference
between that period’s reserve requirementsand those that prevailedduringaselected base
period in January 1991. Our statistical analysis suggests that the April 1992 cut in the marginal
statutory reserverequirement ratio on transactions deposits reducedthis number to about400
institutions. We suspectthat many, and perhaps most, of these institutionsthat have
implemented sweep programs are nowL-Nonbound and hence E-Nonbound.
The spread of sweep programs has two partially-offsetting effects on aggregate RAM.
For an individual institution, the sweep program increases RAM; recall that RAM during each
reserve maintenance period equals an estimate of what the institution’s required reserves would
have been in January 1991 (absent the sweep program) minus the institution’s actual requiredAnderson and Rasche, “Defining the AdjustedMonetary Base...” WorkingPaper 96-014 Appendix 3 Page A3-5
reserves. At the same time, however, the program’s implementation maycause the institution to
become L-Nonbound andhence omitted from RAM.
Our current RAM incorporates these effects only through December 1995. As explained
in the main text and in Appendix I above, RAM through December 1995 has been calculated
from data on individual banks. For the current year, beginning January 1996, RAM is calculated
as RAM1 =[~ 8x N1 0.02 where ~ ~= 0.65 is the estimated proportion of aggregate net
transactions deposits in E-Bound depository institutions at the end of 1995, and 0.02 is the
difference between the marginal reserve requirement on transactions deposits in January 1991
(= 0.12) andduring 1996 (=0.10). The full effect ofsweep programs implemented during 1996
will not be included in RAM until January 1997, when we revise andbenchmarkthe series for
1996 data. Preliminaryestimates through 1996 Q3 suggest that the numberofE-Bound
institutions has fallen to about 200 from about400 at the end of 1995, and that ~5 B has fallen to
about 0.40 from 0.65. We expect that by early 1997 all depository institutions in the United
States will be E-Nonbound, either becausethey have become L-Nonbound or because some
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